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Rethinking Anticircumvention’s 
Interoperability Policy 
Aaron K. Perzanowski* 
Interoperability is widely touted for its ability to spur incremental 
innovation, increase competition and consumer choice, and decrease 
barriers to accessibility.  In light of these attributes, intellectual property 
law generally permits follow-on innovators to create products that 
interoperate with existing systems, even without permission.  The 
anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) represent a troubling departure from this policy, resulting in 
patent-like rights to exclude technologies that interoperate with protected 
platforms.  Although the DMCA contains internal safeguards to preserve 
interoperability, judicial misinterpretation and narrow statutory text 
render those safeguards largely ineffective. 
One approach to counteracting the DMCA’s restrictions on 
interoperability is to rely on antitrust scrutiny and the resulting mandatory 
disclosure of technical information.  However, both doctrinal and policy 
considerations suggest that antitrust offers a less than ideal means of 
lessening the DMCA’s impact on interoperability.  Rather than relying on 
antitrust, this Article proposes a solution that addresses the restriction of 
interoperability at its source.  This approach broadens the DMCA’s existing 
interoperability exemption to create an environment more hospitable to 
interoperable technologies.  To preserve the protections the DMCA offers 
copyright holders, this expanded exemption would disaggregate control 
over interoperable software and devices from the control over access and 
copying that Congress intended the DMCA to enable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In our networked environment, interoperability — the ability of two 
systems to exchange and use information — is of mounting 
importance.  The ability of information, products, and services from a 
variety of providers to work together is often key to commercial 
success, in part because consumers increasingly expect it.1  More 
fundamentally, interoperability has implications for competition, 
innovation, and the public accessibility of creative works.  To varying 
degrees, companies like Facebook, Flickr, and Google have embraced 
the potential of interoperability by opening their platforms to 
independent developers.2  Other firms, perhaps most famously Apple, 
remain committed to the virtues of tightly controlled user experiences 
and thus limit interoperability.3 
The degree and character of interoperability in a given market 
depend in part on law.  The legal regulation of interoperability varies 
not only in the extent to which it favors interoperable technologies, 
but also in the degree to which it intervenes in private market-driven 
decisions.  At the extremes, legal rules either forbid or require 
interoperability.  Conversely, the law might reflect a 
noninterventionist sentiment, leaving the decision to interoperate in 
the hands of developers and consumers.  Between these poles, legal 
rules can encourage or discourage interoperability to varying degrees 
and through a variety of means.  The choice between these legal rules 
helps determine the circumstances under which developers achieve 
interoperability.  Law might favor bilateral agreements between firms 
to interoperate, while frowning on unilateral efforts to interoperate 
with an unwilling partner, or vice versa. 
This Article analyzes the impact of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) on unauthorized unilateral attempts to 
 
 1 See Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to Give 
Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
41, 43-46 (2007) (discussing importance of flexible personal use to consumers). 
 2 See Damon Darlin, A Journey to a Thousand Maps Begins with an Open Code, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at C9 (discussing availability of application programming 
interfaces for Google Maps and Flickr); Posting of Brad Stone to Bits, 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/02/to-counter-google-facebook-sets-code-free/ 
(June 2, 2008, 4:33 EST) (discussing Facebook Platform and Google’s Open Social). 
 3 Apple has recently warmed to some measure of interoperability by opening its 
iPhone to third-party developers in response to consumer and developer demand.  See 
Melissa J. Perenson, Apple’s iPhone SDK Strategy Both Promotes and Stifles Innovation, 
PC WORLD, Mar. 6, 2008, http://www.pcworld.com/article/143210. 
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achieve interoperability.  It argues that the anticircumvention 
provisions of the DMCA unnecessarily inhibit interoperability, and it 
calls for a legislative solution to reconcile the legitimate interests of 
copyright holders with the need for increased freedom to interoperate. 
Part I of this Article defines interoperability and examines its 
implications for innovation and competition as well as its traditional 
treatment under intellectual property (“IP”) law.  Admittedly, 
interoperability does not always yield positive outcomes.  Nonetheless, 
because interoperability tends to increase innovation, competition, 
and accessibility, promoting, or at least permitting, interoperability 
reflects sound policy.  Moreover, such an approach is consistent with 
the general treatment of interoperability in IP law.  The 
interoperability policy that emerges from trade secrecy, copyright, and 
patent law typically permits, and occasionally promotes, 
interoperability. 
Part II discusses the DMCA’s departure from this interoperability 
policy.  The DMCA prohibits the acts of reverse engineering4 that are 
often necessary to develop interoperable products, and bans the 
distribution of technologies that interact with works protected by 
technological measures, marking a substantial break from the earlier 
treatment of interoperability.  Congress recognized the DMCA’s 
potential impact on interoperability and enacted a statutory exemption 
— § 1201(f) — to limit its negative effects.5  Courts, however, have 
consistently misinterpreted this exemption’s basic statutory 
requirements.  Moreover, the exemption’s narrow focus on computer 
programs fails to account for technologies that rely on access to other 
types of copyrighted works to achieve interoperability. 
Because the DMCA’s internal safeguards fail to protect 
interoperability adequately, competitors, consumers, and regulators 
have increasingly turned to other legal doctrines to vindicate 
unauthorized interoperability.  Part III describes the efforts of litigants 
and regulators in the United States and Europe to rely on antitrust and 
competition principles to limit the impact of anticircumvention.  This 
Part expresses skepticism about the role of antitrust in restraining the 
protections offered by the DMCA.  Standard antitrust theories appear 
unlikely to trigger liability consistently, even when tested against the 
most controversial efforts to limit interoperability through 
technological controls.  The tight integration of Apple’s iPod portable 
 
 4 Reverse engineering is the process of “starting with the known product and 
working backward to find the method by which it was developed.”  UNIF. TRADE 
SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985). 
 5 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2006). 
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player and iTunes store serves as one recent example of such an effort.  
More fundamentally, an antitrust analysis typically demonstrates 
considerable deference to the exercise of legitimately acquired IP 
rights.  Sensitive only to behavior that meets its threshold for 
anticompetitiveness, antitrust cannot independently account for the 
unique considerations of incentives for creativity, access, and 
dissemination that define IP policy.  Thus, the first response to any 
unwanted effects of the DMCA should focus on internal limitations on 
the scope of the power it affords rather than external constraints 
imposed by a separate body of law.  
Part IV outlines an alternative approach to the DMCA’s current 
treatment of interoperability.  A broadened § 1201(f) would narrow 
the DMCA’s scope, thereby limiting its ability to accommodate 
technologies that interoperate with all classes of copyrighted works, 
not just computer programs.  The chief difficulty in expanding the 
DMCA’s tolerance of interoperability is ensuring that a more inclusive 
§ 1201(f) does not interfere with the ability of copyright holders to 
impose meaningful limits on access to and copying of their works.  
This Part suggests disaggregating such restrictions from control over 
playback technologies, striking an appropriate balance between 
empowering copyright holders and promoting interoperability. 
I. INTEROPERABILITY 
This Part addresses three preliminary questions about 
interoperability.  First, what is it?  Second, why is it valuable?  And 
third, to what extent does traditional IP doctrine regulate it? 
In short, interoperability is a relationship between two or more 
systems by which they exchange usable information.  Interoperability 
is valuable because it tends to promote innovation, competition, and 
access, each of which gives rise to more concrete benefits for 
consumers and society generally.  Partly in recognition of these 
benefits, IP doctrine has largely avoided any direct regulation of 
unauthorized efforts to interoperate, instead leaving market forces to 
determine whether developers pursue such efforts.  Some IP rules, 
most notably copyright’s favorable treatment of reverse engineering, 
represent explicit efforts to promote interoperability.  To the extent IP 
doctrine directly interferes with efforts to interoperate, it does so only 
under limited circumstances. 
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A. Defining Interoperability 
Interoperability is the ability of a system to work in conjunction or 
otherwise interact with another system.6  With respect to information 
and communication technologies, interoperability takes on a more 
specific meaning — the ability of two systems to exchange information 
and to make use of the information exchanged.7  Although both 
technical and legal definitions of interoperability vary in their precise 
formulations, they share at least two common attributes.  
First, interoperability is a relational concept.  The term does not 
refer to any inherent feature of a system, but describes a relationship 
between or among two or more systems.  As a result, interoperability 
cannot be gauged in isolation.  Instead, to determine whether a system 
exhibits interoperability, that system must be considered in light of 
others with which it interacts.  Consequently, a system exhibiting 
interoperability in one context may be noninteroperable in others.   
Second, interoperability is not typically binary, but rather a matter 
of degree.8  The extent to which two systems interoperate is a function 
 
 6 MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
interoperability (last visited April 29, 2009) (defining interoperability as “ability of a 
system . . . to work with or use the parts or equipment of another system”). 
 7 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (defining interoperability as “the ability of computer 
programs to exchange information, and of such programs mutually to use the 
information which has been exchanged”); 44 U.S.C. § 3601(6) (Supp. III 2005) 
(defining interoperability as “the ability of different operating and software systems, 
applications, and services to communicate and exchange data in an accurate, effective, 
and consistent manner”); Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC) 
(defining interoperability as “the ability to exchange information and mutually to use the 
information which has been exchanged”); INST. OF ELEC. & ELEC. ENG’RS, IEEE STANDARD 
COMPUTER DICTIONARY:  A COMPILATION OF IEEE STANDARD COMPUTER GLOSSARIES 114 
(1990) [hereinafter IEEE] (defining interoperability as “[t]he ability of two or more 
systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has 
been exchanged”); INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
VOCABULARY:  FUNDAMENTAL TERMS (1993) (stating that interoperability is “[t]he capacity 
to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various functional units in a 
manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the unique characteristics 
of those units”); URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BREAKING DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS:  WHEN 
AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION 4 (2007), available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/interop-breaking-barriers_ 
1.pdf (describing interoperability as “the ability to transfer and render useful data and 
other information across systems (which may include organizations), applications, or 
components”); European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European eGovernment 
Services Version 1.0, http://europa.eu.int/idabc/en/document/3761 (defining 
interoperability as “the ability of information and communication technology (ICT) 
systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the 
sharing of information and knowledge”). 
 8 See JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL 8 (1995). 
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of how much information they share and the degree to which they can 
utilize that information.  Complete seamlessness in the exchange and 
use of information between systems is difficult to achieve, but 
interoperability does not demand perfection.9 
Because it is both relational and gradated, interoperability is a 
flexible, context-sensitive descriptor of a variety of interactions.  
However, these characteristics also introduce considerable imprecision.  
Even after a relationship is classified as interoperable, some important 
questions remain unanswered, among them the degree of reciprocity 
between two interoperable systems.  Interoperability does not require 
that the stream of useful information between two systems flow in both 
directions.  Interoperability, therefore, can embrace both bidirectional 
and unidirectional information exchanges.  Further, interoperability 
can arise from cooperation between two or more systems or from a 
unilateral decision by the designers of a single system to interoperate 
with another.  
Indeed, either system in a potential exchange of information can 
take steps to facilitate or frustrate interoperability.  As a result, either 
system in an interoperable relationship can do the heavy lifting in the 
exchange of information.10  A system encourages interoperability by 
using open, unencrypted, or easily reverse-engineered file formats, 
data structures, and communications protocols.  These design choices 
yield outputs that other systems can use without a great deal of effort 
or expense. 
Conversely, systems that encrypt data, employ proprietary data 
structures or communications protocols, or erect barriers to reverse 
engineering, discourage interoperability.11  When systems share 
information in ways that impede interoperability, a heavy burden falls 
on those attempting to make use of that information.  To do so, 
developers must either reverse engineer or license the necessary 
information.  Reverse engineers often contend with both technical 
 
 9 ROBERT J. GLUSHKO & TIM MCGRATH, DOCUMENT ENGINEERING:  ANALYZING AND 
DESIGNING DOCUMENTS FOR BUSINESS INFORMATICS AND WEB SERVICES 172 (2005) 
(“Interoperability doesn’t require that two systems be identical in design or 
implementation, only that they can exchange information and use the information 
they exchange.”). 
 10 Even if developers of two systems fail to establish interoperability on their own 
initiative, third parties can step in to bridge the gap.  By establishing interoperability 
with each of the two systems, a third party can render those two systems interoperable 
with each other. 
 11 Such steps could include the introduction of unnecessary complexity intended 
to thwart interoperability or the updating of protocols or specifications to interfere 
with existing interoperability. 
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complexity and intentional obfuscation that renders their efforts more 
difficult.  Further, licensing may entail prohibitive costs, especially 
when interoperability poses a competitive threat to those in possession 
of the desired information. 
Finally, a full description of interoperability must account for the 
role of the various components of interoperable systems.  Although 
interoperability is typically understood as a system-level attribute, 
some definitions refer to components, functional units, software, and 
hardware as potentially interoperable objects.12  Likewise, 
commentators sometimes speak of the importance of data 
interoperability.13  However, understanding the role of data in 
enabling interoperable relationships requires reflection.   
A system is “[a] collection of components organized to accomplish a 
specific function or set of functions.”14  These components include not 
only software and hardware, but data as well.  Thinking of hardware 
or software as sharing usable information poses little difficulty.  Just as 
systems can share and use information, so can the programs that 
comprise them.  Data, however, does not immediately lend itself to 
being characterized as sharing and using information. 
Data can be conceptualized as either passive or active.  The passive 
view holds that data conveys information only after it has been 
processed or operated on by a program or other external interpreter.15  
So while data may be passed from one system to another, it does not 
engage in the active process of sharing usable information that defines 
interoperability.  This conception of data as inert suggests that 
“interoperable data” simply means data presented in a manner that 
facilitates the exchange of usable information between systems.  Data 
that is unencrypted or organized using standard formats contributes to 
interoperability even if, standing alone, that data does not actively 
share information. 
The active view, in contrast, recognizes that the line between 
program and data is often not clearly defined.16  Just as programs 
 
 12 See supra note 7. 
 13 See, e.g., Stacy Baird, The Government at the Standards Bazaar, 18 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 35, 37-41 (2007) (discussing need for data interoperability in healthcare 
and national security contexts); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the 
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2376 (1994) 
(“Interoperability applies to data as well.”). 
 14 IEEE, supra note 7, at 196. 
 15 See R.L. Ackoff, From Data to Wisdom, 16 J. APPLIED SYS. ANALYSIS 3, 3-4 (1989). 
 16 See MARTIN DAVIS, THE UNIVERSAL COMPUTER:  THE ROAD FROM LEIBNIZ TO TURING 
164-65 (2000) (describing distinction between program and data as illusion); Allen 
Newell, The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1033 
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contain instructions for the interpretation and manipulation of data, 
the structure and arrangement of data is itself partly responsible for its 
interpretation.  From this perspective, data is not just a collection of 
raw facts, but contains ordered and structured information that it can 
share with interoperable systems.  
The active view of data has some explanatory force.  When two 
programs do not interact directly, it might make more sense to think 
of an interoperable relationship existing between one program and 
data created by another.  Imagine two word processors — Microsoft 
Word and Apple’s Pages — residing on separate systems.  When Pages 
opens and renders a Word file, is it interoperating with an application 
or data?  Because Pages does not interact directly with Word, 
characterizing the relationship as program-to-data interoperability 
could be a more helpful conceptual tool.  Regardless of which 
characterization more accurately describes the role of data, both 
perspectives confirm that data, just like programs, can facilitate 
interoperability. 
Interoperability, then, is a nonbinary description of a relationship 
between two or more systems or their components — among them 
hardware, software, and data — wherein information is shared and 
used.  With this general understanding of interoperability established, 
the next subpart turns to the value of interoperability, in particular its 
impact on innovation and competition. 
B. Valuing Interoperability 
Although the intrinsic value of interoperability is often apparent to 
end-users, particularly in its absence, its value is largely instrumental.  
Interoperability is typically celebrated because it fosters a number of 
socially desirable ends:  innovation, competition, consumer choice, 
and accessibility, among others.17  Although these justifications for 
promoting interoperability hold true in most cases, a fuller account of 
the practical consequences of interoperability reveals considerable 
complexity and nuance.18  In some instances, increased 
interoperability could lower innovative and competitive incentives and 
 
(1986) (stating that “the boundary between data and program — that is, what is data 
and what is procedure — is very fluid”). 
 17 See S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998), (discussing the role of interoperability in 
“foster[ing] competition and innovation”); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network 
Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2005) (describing concern of network 
neutrality advocates that “reduction in interoperability would impair the environment 
for competition and innovation”). 
 18 See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 7, at 18. 
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undermine the strategies of firms that hope to establish exclusivity 
over ancillary goods and services. 
Interoperability encourages certain types of innovation, but can 
reduce incentives for others.  Incremental innovation, the process of 
improving and extending existing technologies, benefits from the 
interaction with existing products that interoperability enables.  
Because incremental innovation leverages prior innovative activity, it 
typically requires less investment, spurring contributions from a wider 
variety and greater number of developers.  Not surprisingly, these 
incremental advances account for the lion’s share of innovation.19  
However, interoperability potentially hampers innovators who create 
new technologies from the ground up.  First, the network effects that 
emerge from interoperable technologies could prove difficult to 
overcome, even for a superior offering.20  Second, the possibility that 
follow-on innovators could interoperate and appropriate some of the 
value of a revolutionary innovation could reduce incentives for 
creating groundbreaking products.21  
The effect of interoperability on competition is similarly 
complicated.  In markets that feature interoperability, barriers to entry 
tend to be lower because innovations can take advantage of existing 
infrastructure and customer bases.  Likewise, interoperability lowers 
switching costs because existing investments are not lost when 
migrating to a new interoperable product. As a result of increased 
competition, consumers of interoperable products tend to enjoy lower 
prices and a greater number and variety of available choices.   
Under some circumstances, however, interoperability can reduce 
competition.  Competition could suffer if a handful of firms agree to 
interoperate but exclude newcomers from the resulting interoperable 
network.  Further, interoperability may also discourage 
Schumpeterian competition.22  Incentives to create new technologies 
 
 19 See Steve P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act:  Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 349, 407 
(2008). 
 20 See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and 
Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 71 (1985).  Network effects or network externalities 
exist when the value of a good or service to a consumer increases as more consumers 
utilize that good or service.  See id. 
 21 See Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, The Effects of Antitrust and IP Law on 
Compatibility and Innovation, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 636 (1998). 
 22 See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, “Schumpeterian” Competition and 
Antitrust Policy in High-Tech Markets, 14 COMPETITION 47 (2005) (“At the heart of the 
Schumpeterian argument is the assertion that, in important instances, competition 
primarily occurs through cycles of innovation, rather than through static price or 
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that supplant the current market, rather than compete within it, are 
arguably lessened where competitors are free to interoperate.  Without 
the promise of temporary dominance and monopoly rents, the 
investment necessary for innovation-based competition is a less 
attractive risk.23 
Interoperability also promotes consumer access to innovation and 
creative works.  Other considerations being equal, information and 
services are more likely to find their way into more hands in markets 
that feature interoperability than those that do not.  In part, increased 
accessibility is an outgrowth of the reduced price and increased choice 
brought about by competition.  In addition, interoperability facilitates 
access by allowing information to permeate technological barriers that 
limit distribution.  But this permeability could have unexpected 
consequences.  The strong network effects interoperability creates 
could marginalize information excluded from a dominant network.  
These potential exclusionary practices aside, generally as 
interoperability increases, so too does accessibility. 
These considerations suggest that the methods by which 
interoperable products and services are created matter.  For example, 
if interoperability requires agreements between competitors, 
incentives for radical innovation and dynamic competition might 
increase.  However, the risk of collusive behavior and barriers to entry 
for incremental innovators would likely increase accordingly.  On the 
other hand, legal rules permitting unauthorized efforts to achieve 
interoperability could have the opposite effect, spurring incremental 
innovation and increased static competition.  
The net impact of interoperability is a fact-intensive question and one 
this Article will not endeavor to resolve fully.24  To the extent 
unauthorized interoperability reduces incentives for radical innovation, 
but increases incentives for incremental improvements, that question 
turns, in part, on the relative value of those species of innovation and 
the competition they encourage.  Any such estimate must also account 
for the potential disparity between the incentives currently provided by 
IP regimes and those necessary to spur innovation.  An optimal IP 
 
output competition.  Firms in such markets compete for temporary dominance of the 
market through the introduction of new generations of relevant technology.”). 
 23 Imagine, for example, that prior to inventing the telephone, Bell had been 
informed that rather than enjoying decades of exclusivity with respect to his incipient 
technology, competitors could freely interoperate with the network his invention 
would yield.  Under such circumstances, Bell’s incentives to undertake the innovative 
process likely would have been reduced. 
 24 See GASSER & PALFREY, supra note 7, at 18. 
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system offers incentives sufficient to induce innovative activity, but no 
more.25  In an IP system that over-incentivizes innovators, unauthorized 
interoperability could serve to reduce deadweight loss.  Under such 
circumstances, interoperability could eliminate unnecessary exclusivity 
that inhibits competition and follow-on innovation, but does not yield 
any increase in innovative activity. 
Regardless of interoperability’s broadly dispersed benefits, 
individual firms have strong incentives to limit interoperability with 
their own offerings.  Firms with large user bases and established 
reputations are particularly likely to oppose interoperability for two 
reasons.26  First, interoperability tends to lower barriers to entry 
created by network effects.27  Second, interoperability increases the 
relative value of competing products by enabling access to the 
dominant network.28  Both of these effects favor less-established firms 
over their larger rivals. 
History offers no shortage of examples of efforts to resist 
interoperability.29  Edison’s refusal to allow his records to be played on 
Columbia and Victor phonographs evidenced a reluctance to permit 
rivals to profit from his established network and reputation.30  
Railroads offer another useful set of early examples.  Czarist Russia 
used railroad gauges wider than those common in Europe to slow 
 
 25 See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1203, 1249 (1998) (arguing copyright should “give creators enough entitlements 
to induce them to produce the works from which we all benefit but no more”); Glynn 
S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court:  A Quiet 
Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2004) (suggesting patent protection should be 
conferred only to “precise extent[] necessary to secure each individual innovation’s ex 
ante expected profitability”). 
 26 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 425 (1985).  
 27 Farrell & Katz, supra note 21, at 611 (discussing tendency of network effects to 
increase barriers to entry). 
 28 Farrell & Saloner, supra note 20, at 71. 
 29 Sometimes third parties that reap the benefit of inefficiencies introduced by 
incompatibility, oppose interoperability.  In 1853 for instance, an effort to replace the 
three gauges of railroad tracks in Erie, Pennsylvania, with a uniform track width 
prompted bloody riots.  See Achsah Nesmith, A Long Arduous March Toward 
Standardization, SMITHSONIAN MAG., Mar. 1, 1985, at 176.  Local workers that 
unloaded cargo, changed car wheels, and then reloaded cargo at the juncture of these 
incompatible gauges rightly feared unemployment.  See id. 
 30 Columbia and Victor records were interchangeable because their phonographs 
used the same playback technology.  Edison utilized a unique playback technology — 
ensuring that its records could only be played on its machines — and refused to 
license an adapter to allow Edison records to play on competing hardware.  See 
RANDALL STROSS, THE WIZARD OF MENLO PARK 219-20 (2007). 
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potential invaders,31 a strategy shared by developers who rely on 
proprietary formats to limit access to their platforms.32  In India, the 
British laid nonuniform tracks to regionalize trade,33 a tactic not 
unlike the contemporary region coding of DVDs and video games to 
enable market segmentation.34 
Regardless of the desires of particular firms to exercise control over 
interoperable technologies, the precise social value of interoperability 
remains difficult to measure.  Although it spurs innovation and 
competition in many instances, it may inhibit them in others. Despite 
this uncertainty, as the discussion below describes, IP law operates 
from the typically implicit, but occasionally explicit, assumption that 
interoperability should be encouraged, or at least permitted, in most 
circumstances.  Nonetheless, IP doctrine reflects some sensitivity to 
the potential downsides of interoperability through the greater degree 
of exclusivity afforded by patent protection. 
C. IP & Interoperability Policy 
Trade secrecy, copyright, and patent law have each adopted their 
own set of principles, rules, and exceptions that implicate 
interoperable technologies.  As a result, IP law does not exhibit any 
explicit, unified approach to interoperability.  Nonetheless, an 
articulable interoperability policy emerges from the aggregate 
operation of these doctrines.  That policy generally permits, and 
occasionally encourages, unauthorized interoperability.  This policy 
infrequently interferes with attempts to create unlicensed 
interoperable technologies — most notably, when a valid patent 
controls the interfaces necessary for communication between two 
systems.  Although this policy is partly the result of specific exceptions 
and defenses sensitive to interoperability concerns, it flows largely 
from freestanding limits on the scope of the relevant exclusive rights. 
The law of trade secrets facilitates interoperability by recognizing 
reverse engineering — the process of “starting with the known 
product and working backward to find the method by which it was 
 
 31 See BAND & KATOH, supra note 8, at 40-41. 
 32 The Nintendo Gamecube console, for example, was designed to accept 
miniature game discs rather than standard-sized DVDs as a means to prevent use of 
unauthorized copies.  See Alex Pham & Jon Healey, Games Prove a Hassle for Web 
Pirates, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 2003, at C1. 
 33 See BAND & KATOH, supra note 8, at 41. 
 34 See Stephen Manes, You Can’t Do That to Me!, FORBES, Oct. 30, 2006, at 82, 
available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/1030/082.html. 
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developed”35 — as a legitimate means to obtain information about 
lawfully acquired products.36  Without reverse engineering, developers 
would be unable to discover communications protocols, format 
specifications, and other program interfaces that enable 
interoperability.37  The favored status of reverse engineering, however, 
grows out of fundamental limits on the scope of trade secret 
protection, rather than any express intent to encourage 
interoperability.  
Likewise, the longstanding limits on the extent to which copyright 
regulates interoperable technologies create a legal environment 
hospitable to interoperability.  First, copyright law does not grant 
exclusive rights in systems or their functional components, and 
excludes them from the scope of protection of otherwise protected 
subject matter.38  By refusing protection for this key class of potentially 
interoperable objects, copyright law avoids directly regulating 
 
 35 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (amended 1985); see Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (defining reverse engineering as “starting with 
the known product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its 
development or manufacture”); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law 
and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1577 (May, 2002) (defining 
reverse engineering as “the process of extracting know-how or knowledge from a 
human-made artifact”). 
 36 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476 (recognizing reverse engineering as proper); 
Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3 Ohio C.C (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902) (permitting use of 
information discovered “by examination of the manufactured products sold or offered 
for sale to the public”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995); 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. 2 (stating reverse engineering is proper if product 
was acquired by “fair and honest means”). 
 37 See, e.g., Secure Serv. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 
1354, 1361 (E.D. Va. 1989) (permitting reverse engineering of secure facsimile 
machines to discover implementation of communications protocol necessary for 
interoperability).  In the business-to-business context, when products are made 
available only to those who have agreed to terms prohibiting disclosure or reverse 
engineering, rather than the public at large, such acts face more substantial challenges.  
See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.05[5][III] (2004) (discussing 
likelihood that contractual terms could render reverse engineering improper in some 
circumstances). 
 38 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879) (holding that copyright in text 
describing system of accounting did not extend to system itself); see also Perris v. 
Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675 (1878) (holding that copyright in map “marked with 
arbitrary coloring and signs” was not infringed by map using similar system).  
Congress codified Baker’s holding in the Copyright Act of 1976.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
102(b) (2006).  For a detailed discussion of Baker, its progeny, and their implications 
for the scope of copyright protection, see Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law 
Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 
1921-77 (2007). 
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interoperability.39  The originality requirement,40 the doctrines of 
merger, scènes à faire,41 and copyright misuse likewise contribute to 
copyright’s permissiveness regarding interoperability.42 
Copyright law also avoids interference with interoperability by 
limiting the extent to which its exclusive rights reach users of 
copyrighted works and developers of technology.  The mere use of 
lawfully acquired copies of protected works — as opposed to their 
reproduction and distribution — typically falls outside of the 
copyright holder’s statutory monopoly.43  Simply put, copyright 
 
 39 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding 
that menu command hierarchy of spreadsheet application was method of operation), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233, 233 (1996); Brown Instrument Co. v. 
Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 910-11 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (holding chart that served as 
component of measuring device ineligible for copyright protection); Taylor 
Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding that 
chart used as component of apparatus that measured and recorded temperatures was 
“as indispensable to the operation of a recording thermometer as are any of the other 
elements,” and thus “not the proper subject of copyright”); see also Samuelson, supra 
note 38, at 1936-37 (discussing Taylor). 
 40 The originality requirement reinforces Baker by limiting copyright protection 
for the output of an unprotectable system.  See, e.g., ATC Distrib. v. Whatever It Takes 
Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that system 
of numbering transmission parts was ineligible for copyright protection as either 
taxonomy or compilation of data); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 
282 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that serial numbers for identifying parts were 
characterized by “an utter absence of creativity,” and allowing distributors of 
interchangeable parts to utilize identical numbers); Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 
1366, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that command codes used to program 
telecommunications hardware were unoriginal, allowing competitor to use 
interoperable codes).  But see ADA v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that taxonomy of medical codes was original). 
 41 Applied to computer programs, the merger and scènes à faire doctrines suggest 
that if a limited number of options exist to achieve a given function efficiently, 
interoperate with another application, or run in a given environment, copyright will 
not permit exclusive control over those program elements.  See Computer Assocs. Int’l 
v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709-10 (2nd Cir. 1992) (holding that merger doctrine 
precludes exclusive rights in structural choices dictated by efficiency, and analogizing 
programming constraints dictated by external hardware compatibility and 
interoperability requirements to those recognized by scènes à faire doctrine).  
 42 See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc. 166 F.3d 772, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that reasonable juror could have concluded that license agreement that 
prevented development of interoperable products was misuse of copyright because it 
resulted in patent-like protections for unpatented devices). 
 43 See Stover v. Lathrop, 33 F. 348, 349 (C.C.D. Colo. 1888) (holding that “the effect 
of a copyright is not to prevent any reasonable use of the book which is sold . . . merely 
using it, in no manner infringes upon the copyright”).  Of course, public performance 
and display of a work crosses the line separating unregulated private use and a public 
exploitation within the copyright grant.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (5) (2006). 
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provides no exclusive right to read.44  Without the power to dictate the 
circumstances under which consumers read books, listen to records, 
or watch films, copyright holders are poorly positioned to control the 
use of interoperable technologies.  Even where the use of such 
technologies gives rise to direct infringement by a user, limits on 
indirect liability insulate developers in most instances.45 
But not all copyright rules favoring interoperability grow out of 
independent constraints on the scope of copyright protection.  The 
reverse engineering privilege more explicitly recognizes the value of 
interoperability and copyright’s role in promoting it.  Although the 
discovery of unprotected program elements through reverse 
engineering often requires the literal copying of protected expression, 
courts regard such copying as a fair use when undertaken to achieve 
interoperability.46  This willingness to enlist the fair use defense to 
address threats to interoperability suggests that copyright not only 
tolerates interoperable technologies, but also promotes them.   
Patent protection offers rights holders the most direct means of 
asserting control over interoperable technologies.  Nonetheless, much 
like trade secrecy and copyright, patent law avoids directly regulating 
interoperability in most cases.  The creation of products that 
interoperate with patented inventions does not infringe unless it 
entails making, using, or selling the patented invention.47  Although 
the Patent Act neither expressly prohibits nor permits reverse 
engineering,48 the exhaustion doctrine ensures that purchasers are free 
 
 44 But see Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
29, 31-32 (1994) (warning that expansive reading of reproduction right in digital 
environment could lead to copyright holder control over act of reading and other 
personal uses). 
 45 Indirect liability enables copyright holders to exert control over the distribution 
and use of technologies that give rise to end-user infringement under four 
circumstances:  first, if the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge; second, if the technology at issue is 
incapable of substantial noninfringing use, see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 490-93 (1984); third, if the distributor of that technology 
intentionally encourages or induces end-user infringement, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935-36 (2005); or fourth, if the 
distributor possesses the legal right and practical ability to control end-user 
infringement and enjoys a direct financial benefit from such infringement, see Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Grokster, 545 
U.S. at 930). 
 46 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that copying necessary to engage in reverse engineering was fair use);  infra 
Part II.B. 
 47 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 48 Id. (defining patent infringement and omitting any reference to acts of reverse 
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to use a patented product once lawfully sold.49  Such use could include 
reverse engineering to achieve interoperability.  
In the software context, however, patents may offer greater 
opportunities to restrict interoperability.  First, reverse engineering 
software may entail copying or “making” the invention rather than 
merely using it, potentially rendering an exhaustion defense 
unavailable.50  Second, given the prevalence of licensing agreements in 
the software context, such licenses could override the exhaustion 
principle to the extent courts treat unilateral prohibitions on reverse 
engineering as enforceable license limitations.51  These concerns aside, 
patents most directly threaten the creation of unauthorized 
interoperable technologies when they cover interfaces that define 
communication between two systems.  If a particular protocol or 
process is necessary to exchange information with a device or program 
and a valid patent controls that interface, interoperability requires the 
patent holder’s permission.52 
However, even acknowledging the role of patents, IP law 
infrequently interferes with unauthorized attempts to achieve 
interoperability.  Some of the doctrines that contribute to this 
overarching policy are longstanding limits on the scope of IP rights; 
others are of more recent vintage and reflect direct judicial awareness 
of the value of interoperability.  As the next Part details, the DMCA 
 
engineering). 
 49 See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1942) (holding 
when patent holder made first unrestricted sale of patented item, its exclusive rights 
with respect to that particular item were exhausted).  
 50 Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software 
Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (noting that reverse engineering computer 
program by decompilation could constitute infringing “making,” but urging courts to 
reject this approach). 
 51 See Bowers v. BayState Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323-25 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(enforcing anti-reverse engineering clause of software license); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 707-09 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that label reading 
“single use only” established a conditional sale sufficient to overcome exhaustion).  
But see Cohen & Lemley, supra note 50, at 33-34 (noting that courts have been 
divided on role of unilateral license provisions in altering application of exhaustion 
principles); Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 35, at 1630 (suggesting that courts 
should avoid enforcing anti-reverse engineering provisions to the extent they create 
“detrimental effect on competitive development and innovation”). 
 52 See Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16-19, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323838) (discussing impact of interface patents on 
interoperability); see, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
(BNA) 1401, 1414-15 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that development of interoperable 
product infringed interface patent). 
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embodies a dramatic shift away from IP law’s general receptiveness to 
interoperability.  The DMCA facilitates unprecedented control over 
interoperable devices and services without any compelling justification 
for its departure from the interoperability policy that emerged in prior 
decades. 
II. ANTICIRCUMVENTION & INTEROPERABILITY 
As network communication and digital copying technologies 
increased the threat of infringement, copyright holders expressed 
reluctance to distribute their works on the Internet in the absence of 
additional legal protections to “make digital networks safe places to 
disseminate and exploit copyrighted materials.”53  Reflecting these 
fears, two World Intellectual Property Organization treaties called for 
“adequate legal protection” against the circumvention of technological 
protection measures (“TPM”).54  Congress, ostensibly to implement its 
treaty obligations, enacted the DMCA in 1998.55 
The DMCA defines two types of technological controls and two 
restrictions on their manipulation.  Access controls are technological 
measures intended to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted 
works.  Copy controls are measures intended to prevent infringement 
of the exclusive rights afforded by copyright.56  The DMCA regulates 
both circumvention — the act of decrypting an encrypted work, or 
otherwise disabling, removing, or avoiding a technological measure57 
— and trafficking — the manufacture, distribution, sale, or offering to 
the public of devices, tools, or technologies that enable 
circumvention.58  With respect to access controls, the DMCA prohibits 
 
 53 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998). 
 54 WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 
(1997), 36 I.L.M. 65, 84 (1997); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997)  
 55 Arguably, implementing legislation was unnecessary in the United States 
because indirect copyright infringement liability reached the production and 
distribution of circumvention devices incapable of substantial noninfringing uses.  See 
Pamela Samuelson, Why the Anti-Circumvention Rules Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 519, 531-32 (1999). 
 56 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2006).  These two varieties of TPMs often 
overlap in practice, and courts struggle to classify them.  See, e.g., Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 438 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating TPM is copy 
control even though “it might very well be that copying is not blocked”); 321 Studios 
v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (stating TPM is 
copy control if copying allowed “is not particularly useful”). 
 57 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
 58 Id. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1).  The trafficking bans apply to devices:  (1) primarily 
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both circumvention and trafficking in circumvention technologies.59  
The DMCA likewise bans trafficking in technologies that circumvent 
copy controls.60  The act of circumventing a copy control, while not 
prohibited by § 1201, may constitute copyright infringement. 
This Part considers the impact of these prohibitions on 
interoperability.  Because the DMCA enables broad rights-holder 
control over interoperable technologies, it deviates from IP law’s 
traditional treatment of interoperability.  Recognizing the DMCA’s 
potential impact, Congress enacted § 1201(f) as a statutory exemption 
designed to limit the extent to which anticircumvention law disturbed 
existing interoperability policy.  Both Congress and the courts, 
however, have undermined § 1201(f)’s effectiveness.  First, courts 
have misinterpreted several of its basic requirements, encouraging 
overreaching claims far exceeding the scope of the DMCA’s core 
concerns.  Second, Congress chose to limit the scope of § 1201(f) to 
computer programs, a policy choice that rendered § 1201(f) ill 
equipped to safeguard interoperability fully. 
A. The DMCA’s Departure from Existing Interoperability Policy 
As Congress intended, the DMCA addresses activities that, if 
unfettered, could have discouraged the development of robust digital 
marketplaces for copyrighted works.  By virtue of its breadth, 
however, the DMCA gives rise to a number of unintended 
consequences, including restricting interoperability.61  Rather than 
allowing or encouraging interoperability in the absence of an 
applicable patent right, the DMCA enables those who employ TPMs to 
restrict the development, distribution, and use of interoperable 
technologies.  
The DMCA, of course, does not prohibit interoperability.  
Developers remain free to interoperate with systems that do not 
incorporate TPMs.  Likewise, the DMCA permits interoperation with 
TPM-restricted works so long as access and copying are authorized.  
 
designed for circumvention; (2) with only limited commercially significant uses aside 
from circumvention; or (3) marketed for use in circumvention.  Id.  
 59 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 
 60 Id. § 1201(b)(1). 
 61 See John A. Rothchild, The Social Costs of Technological Protection Measures, 34 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1181, 1198-1204 (2007) (discussing various negative externalities 
resulting from use of TPMs).  See generally ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES:  TEN YEARS UNDER THE DMCA (2008), http://www.eff.org/files/ 
DMCAUnintended10.pdf (reporting cases in which DMCA’s anticircumvention 
provisions were used to suppress legitimate activities). 
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Developers that enable interoperability with works restricted by TPMs 
without the permission of the relevant rights holders, however, face 
potential liability under the DMCA.  
The restraints on unilateral efforts to achieve interoperability are 
threefold.  First, the DMCA discourages the creation of unauthorized 
interoperable products by prohibiting certain acts of reverse 
engineering.62  The DMCA’s circumvention ban functions at its core as a 
bar against the reverse engineering of products containing effective 
access controls.63  To interoperate with a work protected by such a 
control, a developer must discover interface information through 
reverse engineering.  Those acts of reverse engineering generally require 
access to the underlying work.  But a developer that “avoid[s], 
bypass[es], remove[s], deactivate[s], or impair[s]” a TPM to gain access 
and obtain interoperability information risks violation of § 1201.64 
Second, the DMCA adversely affects interoperability by prohibiting 
the distribution of interoperable products.65  To interoperate with a 
work that incorporates an effective TPM, a product must include code 
that enables access or copying of the protected work.  Otherwise, it 
would lack the ability to exchange information with the TPM-
protected system.  Products designed to access or copy a work 
protected by an effective TPM, however, are subject to the trafficking 
ban.  Thus, the distribution of a product that interoperates with a 
work protected by a technological measure could constitute an 
independent violation of § 1201.  Third, because the use of such a 
product could entail an act of circumvention, the DMCA exposes end 
users to potential liability for utilizing devices that enable 
interoperability. 
In short, creating, distributing, or using products that interoperate 
with works restricted by effective TPMs may violate the circumvention 
or trafficking bans. 66  As a result, in the absence of any applicable 
 
 62 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 63 An access control is effective if “in the ordinary course of its operation, [it] 
requires the application of information, or a process or a treatment” before access to 
the underlying work is granted.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).  Copy controls must meet 
an even lower bar.  They are effective “if the measure, in the ordinary course of its 
operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a copyright 
owner under this title.”  Id. § 1201(b)(2)(B). 
 64 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A). 
 65 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) & (b)(1). 
 66 Imagine, for example, a device that enables unauthorized playback of TPM-
restricted video content purchased from an online retailer.  To create such a product, 
its developers would most likely reverse engineer the TPM system to understand its 
authentication system, likely engaging in one or more acts of circumvention in the 
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defense, the DMCA entitles copyright holders, TPM developers, or 
mere licensees to prevent the emergence of interoperable products so 
long as their protection measures satisfy the minimal statutory 
threshold for effectiveness.67  This potential for control over 
interoperable technologies represents a marked departure from the 
treatment of interoperability under earlier IP doctrine.  By yielding 
power over the development and distribution of products that 
interface with TPM-protected works, the DMCA results in control 
over interoperable technologies on par with that conferred by a patent 
grant.68  But unlike a patent, which must satisfy the comparatively 
exacting standards of novelty and nonobviousness, an effective TPM 
must only restrict access and copying in the ordinary course of 
operation.69  As a result, the DMCA offers a far less demanding path to 
exclusive control over interoperable technologies. 
B. Section 1201(f):  The Interoperability Exemption 
The DMCA’s potential restraint of interoperability did not go 
unnoticed during the congressional debate.70  Software industry 
groups argued that the DMCA would undermine Sega v. Accolade,71 a 
case decided just six years earlier that vindicated the reverse 
engineering of software programs.72  In response, Congress enacted 
§ 1201(f) to preserve the right to reverse engineer computer programs 
for interoperability purposes. 
 
process.  To the extent the resulting device is designed to bypass that authentication 
system to ensure interoperability with TPM-restricted videos, the developers face 
potential liability under the DMCA’s trafficking bans.  Finally, if the device enables 
circumvention, each time an end user plays back a protected video, that user arguably 
engages in an act of circumvention.   
 67 See supra note 63. 
 68 See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management 
Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 570 (2005) (suggesting “the anti-circumvention 
provisions may therefore play the role that patents sometimes play in suppressing 
device interoperation”). 
 69 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B), (b)(2)(B). 
 70 In addition to addressing concerns over interoperability, Congress attempted to 
limit the reach of the DMCA by creating a number of statutory exemptions protecting 
activities including encryption research and security testing.  See id. § 1201(d)-(j).  In 
addition, the DMCA permits the Librarian of Congress to define temporary 
exemptions from the circumvention ban for specific classes of copyrighted works if 
their noninfringing use has been adversely affected.  Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(C). 
 71 JONATHAN BAND, INTEROPERABILITY UNDER THE DMCA 12 (2008), available at 
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/TSPV09_chapter_02_thumb.pdf. 
 72 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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In Sega, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that creating 
intermediate copies of a computer program during reverse engineering 
was a fair use when undertaken to isolate unprotected program 
elements.73  Sega developed the Genesis, a home video game console, 
and licensed third-party developers to create compatible games.  
Accolade, unwilling to agree to Sega’s licensing terms, decided to 
create games interoperable with the Genesis system without Sega’s 
assistance or approval.  Instead, Accolade reverse engineered Genesis 
games to determine the console’s interoperability requirements, 
creating copies of Sega’s code in the process.  Accolade then used the 
interface information gleaned from Sega’s code to create its own 
interoperable games.74  Sega sued Accolade, maintaining that the 
intermediate copying of its code in the reverse engineering process 
constituted copyright infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Sega that intermediate copying of 
software programs was a prima facie violation of the reproduction 
right.75  Nonetheless, the court recognized that reverse engineering, 
and the attendant intermediate copying, were “the only means of 
gaining access to . . . unprotected aspects of the program” necessary to 
achieve interoperability.76  Accordingly, the court held that Accolade’s 
copying was a fair use.77  While acknowledging that other legitimate 
interests could justify reverse engineering, Sega unambiguously 
identifies interoperability as worthy of promotion.78  Other courts 
followed suit, holding that copying necessary for reverse engineering 
is a fair use.79 
Software companies worried that the DMCA would allow platform 
developers like Sega to exclude unauthorized developers from 
achieving interoperability by veiling their works behind even the 
thinnest of technological measures.  Sega, in fact, employed a 
 
 73 Id. at 1527. 
 74 Id. at 1515. 
 75 Id. at 1519. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 1520. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that intermediate copying was necessary to reverse engineer 
BIOS of Sony Playstation to “gain access to [its] unprotected functional elements”); 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(“Reverse engineering, untainted by the purloined copy of the 10NES program and 
necessary to understand 10NES, is a fair use.”).  But see Compaq Computer Corp. v. 
Procom Tech., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1419-21 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (holding that reverse 
engineering and copying plaintiff’s hard drive threshold values was not fair use). 
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rudimentary protection measure to thwart the use of unlicensed games 
on its Genesis console.80  Six years before the DMCA however, 
Accolade had no legal obligation to respect that restraint.81  Developers 
understandably viewed a broad anticircumvention right as a threat to 
the freedom to interoperate endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in Sega. 
Congress heeded these concerns by including an exemption to both 
the circumvention and trafficking bans meant to “ensure that the 
effect of [Sega] is not changed by enactment” of the DMCA.82  
Congress’s intention to “allow legitimate software developers to 
continue engaging in certain activities for the purpose of achieving 
interoperability to the extent permitted by law prior to the enactment 
of [the DMCA]” represented explicit congressional recognition of the 
permissibility of reverse engineering and the value of 
interoperability.83  
Section 1201(f)(1) allows the circumvention of access controls if:  
(1) those controls restrict access to portions of a computer program; 
(2) the circumventor lawfully acquired a copy of that program; (3) 
circumvention occurs for the sole purpose of identifying and analyzing 
program elements necessary to achieve interoperability; (4) 
interoperability is sought with an independently created program; (5) 
the information obtained through reverse engineering is not otherwise 
readily available; and (6) the identification and analysis of the 
underlying work does not constitute infringement.84  
Section 1201(f)(2) allows the development and use of technologies 
that enable circumvention to the extent necessary to achieve 
 
 80 See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1528. 
 81 See id. 
 82 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998), (citing Sega, 977 F.2d 1510).  But § 1201(f), 
while titled the “Reverse Engineering” exemption, does not privilege all acts of reverse 
engineering, but only acts undertaken to achieve interoperability.  Sega strongly 
suggests that reverse engineers with other legitimate rationales for identifying 
unprotected program elements could benefit from the fair use defense as well.  See 
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1520.  As a result, § 1201(f) does not permit reverse engineering to 
the full extent of prior law, but only under a limited subset of the circumstances 
permitted under Sega.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital 
Millennium”, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 149 n.35 (1999) (suggesting that § 
1201(f) might not embrace all reverse engineering permitted under prior law). 
 83 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32.  
 84 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006).  The language and basic requirements of § 
1201(f) borrow heavily from Article Six of the EU Software Directive.  See Council 
Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC); see also Jonathan Band & Taro 
Isshiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act:  A Flawed First 
Step, 3 CYBER LAW. 2 (1999). 
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interoperability.85  Further, circumventors may distribute information 
lawfully acquired, or tools lawfully developed, for the sole purpose of 
enabling interoperability.86 
Early § 1201 litigation demonstrated that Congress’s concern over 
safeguarding interoperability was warranted.  The very first complaint 
alleging violation of § 1201, as well as an early companion suit, 
targeted interoperable products created through reverse engineering.87  
Sony developed and marketed the Playstation, a video game console 
that played games stored on CD-ROM.  Two companies, Connectix 
and Bleem, developed software emulators that allowed the owners of 
Playstation discs to play those games on their computers.88  While the 
emulators were similar enough to the Playstation to enable cross-
platform game play, Connectix and Bleem did not copy every element 
of the Playstation’s internals.  According to Sony, the emulators 
ignored an access control built into the Playstation platform — an 
authorization code on each disc.  If a game disc did not contain this 
code, the Playstation refused to load it.  Sony argued that because the 
emulators did not scan for this code, Connectix and Bleem 
circumvented a TPM that controlled access to Playstation games.89 
 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2).  Arguably the protections offered by § 1201(f) do not 
extend to end users of circumvention technologies, but only to their developers.  
Although § 1201(f)(2) permits one to “employ technological means to circumvent a 
technological measure . . . for the purpose of enabling interoperability,” that subsection 
refers only to § 1201’s antitrafficking provisions, not its anticircumvention provision.  
Id.  The omission of a specific reference to circumvention liability in § 1201(f)(2) is 
peculiar for at least two reasons.  First, one who “employs” a circumvention tool 
appears to be engaged in acts of circumvention rather than acts of trafficking, rendering 
defenses to the antitrafficking provisions inapposite.  Second, the failure to extend 
protection against circumvention liability to end users would seem to undermine the 
purpose of exempting developers of circumvention tools.  Developers would enjoy 
immunity for reverse engineering to obtain interoperability information, creating 
circumvention tools, and distributing those tools to enable interoperability.  But 
consumers would still face liability for utilizing those admittedly privileged tools, a 
rather curious result.  To the extent a literal reading of § 1201(f)(2) demands such a 
counterintuitive result, the statutory text should be revised.  See infra note 266. 
 86 Id. § 1201(f)(3). 
 87 See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 61, at 11; see also Band & Isshiki, supra 
note 84 (noting that Sony’s complaint against Connectix was first to allege 
circumvention violations under § 1201). 
 88 The Connectix and Bleem emulators were developed for the Mac and Windows 
operating systems, respectively.  To achieve interoperability, Connectix reverse 
engineered the copyrighted Playstation BIOS, an act ultimately deemed a fair use by 
the Ninth Circuit.  See Sony Computer Entm’t Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 
609 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 89 See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 222-23 (2000) (testimony of 
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Sony’s anticircumvention theory, however, was deeply flawed.  
Because any standard CD-ROM drive could read Playstation game 
data, it is far from clear that the Playstation authorization code 
functioned as an effective access control.90  Thus, the “no mandate” 
provision of the DMCA freed the emulators of any obligation to 
comply with the Playstation authentication code.91  In addition, Sony 
filed its complaints during the initial two-year moratorium on 
enforcement of the DMCA’s circumvention ban.92  Not surprisingly, 
Sony ultimately chose to abandon its § 1201 claims.93 
Assuming Sony could have overcome these threshold obstacles,94 
the emulator cases would have provided an opportunity for courts to 
 
Jonathan Hangartner), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/hearings/1201-519.pdf.  
The source of Sony’s hostility towards emulation is worth pausing to consider.  
Sony may have feared that emulators would encourage infringement of Playstation 
games, a worry of the very sort Congress hoped to alleviate with the DMCA.  On the 
other hand, Sony may have feared that emulation offered the emerging PC gaming 
platform a competitive advantage.  With the introduction of emulators, PC gamers 
could play the entire stock of Playstation games in addition to games developed 
specifically for the PC.  If PCs became the dominant gaming platform, Sony risked 
losing a sizable portion of its revenues — in the form of reduced console sales and 
decreased licensing revenue — as consumers and game developers defected to the PC 
platform.  Tellingly, after losing its copyright infringement suit against Connectix, 
Sony purchased the company, eventually discontinuing the emulation software rather 
than implement support for the Playstation authorization code.  See Peter Cohen, Sony 
Acquires Virtual Game Station from Connectix, MACWORLD, Mar. 15, 2001, 
http://www.macworld.com/article/20791/2001/03/vgs.html; Sony Computer 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/chp7/ 
sonyconnectix.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).  Regardless of Sony’s motivation, its 
anticircumvention claims would have resulted in control over interoperable 
technologies regardless of either copyright or patent infringement, control not 
envisioned by Congress when it enacted the DMCA. 
 90 Standard CD-ROM drives do not read the region of the disc containing the 
authentication code, so the fact that the emulators did not acknowledge the code is 
not surprising.  See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, supra note 89, at 222-23. 
 91 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3). 
 92 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A). 
 93 Sony continued its litigation against Connectix and Bleem on other theories.  
See Connectix, 203 F.3d at 609 (holding that reverse engineering of PlayStation BIOS 
by Connectix was fair use); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 
1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Bleem’s use of screen shots from PlayStation 
games was fair use). 
 94 Sony eventually succeeded in enforcing Playstation access controls under the 
DMCA.  See Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. GameMasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976, 
987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (enjoining vendor of Game Enhancer device that allowed 
players to load games intended for foreign markets).  Notably, Sony offered no proof 
that the Game Enhancer enabled infringement, only that it interfered with Sony’s 
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apply § 1201(f) to facts similar to those that motivated its creation.  
The activities of Bleem and Connectix — reverse engineering a 
console to discover the technical requirements for interoperability — 
shared obvious similarities to the conduct at issue in Sega.  In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit eventually held that Connectix was entitled to the Sega 
fair use defense for its reverse engineering of the Playstation console.95 
The Playstation emulators present a fairly simple § 1201(f) analysis.  
Sony’s alleged protection measure restricted access to Playstation 
games, computer programs lawfully acquired by Connectix and Bleem.  
The reverse engineering appears to have occurred for the sole purpose 
of obtaining information necessary to render Playstation games 
interoperable with independently created emulators.  Further, § 
1201(f)(1) would have permitted circumvention because these acts of 
reverse engineering did not constitute infringement — so long as the 
interoperability information was not readily available.  Moreover, the 
distribution of the emulator software, assuming it enabled acts of 
circumvention, would have been privileged so long as facilitating 
interoperability was the sole purpose of its distribution. 
The first case to consider § 1201(f), Universal City Studios v. 
Reimerdes, presented very different facts.  The defendants were 
accused of distributing DeCSS, an application that defeated the 
Content Scramble System (“CSS”) designed to prevent unlicensed 
players from decrypting and playing DVD movies.96  According to the 
defendants, DeCSS fell within the protections of § 1201(f) because it 
enabled DVDs to interoperate with playback software written for 
Linux operating systems.97 
The Reimerdes court offered expansive readings of the DMCA’s 
liability provisions and narrow interpretations of its various defenses, 
among them § 1201(f).98  The court’s primary basis for rejecting 
defendants’ § 1201(f) defense, one supported by both the text and 
legislative history of the provision, was that § 1201(f) applies only to 
the circumvention of protection measures that restrict access to 
 
market segmentation strategy.  Id.; see also Sony v. Divineo, 457 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (granting summary judgment against defendants who trafficked in 
Playstation modification chips). 
 95 Connectix, 203 F.3d at 609. 
 96 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
 97 Id. at 218. 
 98 See id.; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asserting that DMCA “fundamentally altered the landscape” of 
copyright). 
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computer programs, not copyrighted works generally.99  Because CSS 
restricted access to movies stored on DVDs, not computer programs, § 
1201(f) did not apply.  Had the court been satisfied with this decisive 
rationale, there would be little reason to criticize its § 1201(f) analysis.  
But Reimerdes considered additional elements of the interoperability 
defense, muddying the waters for future courts. 
First, the court appeared to heighten the already demanding sole 
purpose requirement of § 1201(f) — that any acts of reverse 
engineering be undertaken for the “sole purpose” of achieving 
interoperability.  Defendants argued that DeCSS was necessary to 
enable interoperability with Linux-based DVD player software.  At the 
time, no licensed Linux-compatible DVD players were available, 
preventing Linux users from viewing lawfully purchased DVDs on 
their computers.100  DeCSS, however, ran under both Windows and 
Linux.  Because Windows users faced no shortage of authorized DVD 
players, the court concluded that DeCSS was not developed solely to 
enable interoperability.101  Given defendants’ emphasis on Linux-based 
players, the court’s concern over Windows compatibility is 
understandable.  In addition, the court likely recognized the risk that 
defendants might invoke interoperability as a pretext to legitimize 
circumvention aimed at infringement.  Even acknowledging this 
worry, the mere fact that DeCSS could enable interoperability on both 
platforms, standing alone, reveals little about the purpose of its 
development.  To the extent Reimerdes suggests that the sole purpose 
requirement demands a showing that interoperability is necessary to 
access or use a work, it misapplies the statute. 
Second, the court misconstrued the limits on distribution of 
interoperability information and circumvention tools under § 
1201(f)(3).  Ignoring the plain language of § 1201(f), the court 
claimed the statute permitted dissemination of information obtained 
through reverse engineering, but not the means of circumvention used 
to obtain such information.102  The court also erred in imposing a 
blanket rule against the public distribution of exempted tools and 
information.103  The statute contains no express ban against public 
dissemination.  Instead, it permits information lawfully obtained 
through reverse engineering, as well as exempted circumvention tools, 
to be made available so long as the sole purpose requirement is 
 
 99 See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218; infra Part II.D.3.  
 100 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n v. Bunner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185, 189 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 101 See Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
 102 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(2)-(3) (2006). 
 103 See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320. 
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satisfied.104  A defendant who makes information or tools widely 
available might face more difficulty meeting this requirement than one 
who makes a more limited disclosure, but the statute imposes no 
freestanding limit on the scope of distribution. 
Since Reimerdes, § 1201(f) has been the subject of surprisingly little 
judicial analysis.  In light of the interoperability concerns looming in 
many DMCA disputes, one would expect a higher frequency of 
§ 1201(f)-based defenses.  Nonetheless, only a handful of published 
opinions refer to § 1201(f), and no defendant has yet succeeded on a § 
1201(f) defense.  In the years following the DMCA’s enactment, 
Reimerdes offered the sole judicial analysis of § 1201(f).  The approach 
to DMCA interpretation embodied by Reimerdes, characterized by an 
expansive application of the DMCA’s liability provisions and 
skepticism towards its statutory exemptions, has emboldened plaintiffs 
to test the bounds of their control over interoperable products.105 
C. The Durable Goods Cases 
Early DMCA litigation focusing on entertainment content, while 
arguably protecting legitimate copyright interests, evinced a desire on 
the part of some plaintiffs to interfere with interoperable 
technologies.106  As consumer electronics manufacturers began to 
enforce TPMs incorporated in their products however, any pretense of 
protecting against the threat of Internet-based infringement was 
abandoned.  Courts ultimately proved hostile to these efforts to 
suppress interoperability, but failed to clarify the application of § 
1201(f) in the process. 
Lexmark International v. Static Control Components addressed one of 
the first attempts to incorporate TPMs into durable goods.107  
Lexmark, a manufacturer of laser and inkjet printers, like many of its 
competitors, sold printers cheap, but charged a premium for ink 
cartridges.  To lessen incentives to refill empty cartridges or purchase 
cartridges refilled by third parties, Lexmark sold “prebate” cartridges 
at a deep discount in exchange for an agreement that consumers 
 
 104 The court claimed that § 1201(f) permits the sharing of interoperability 
information only by one who acquires that information. 
 105 See Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable 
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
981, 1005-06, 1024 (2007). 
 106 See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1110-11 
(2003) (discussing anticompetitive uses of DMCA); Burk, supra note 68, at 561-65 
(same).  
 107 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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would use the cartridge only once and return it to Lexmark.108  
Lexmark employed a TPM intended to prevent unauthorized 
cartridges from interoperating with its printers.109  
Lexmark alleged that Static Control Components (“SCC”), creator 
of the SMARTEK chip, which mimicked Lexmark’s authentication 
sequence, was trafficking in a circumvention device.110  According to 
Lexmark, the operation of its printers relied on the Printer Engine 
Program (“PEP”).  If users installed a non-Lexmark cartridge, the 
authentication sequence would fail, rendering inaccessible those 
portions of the PEP that enabled printer functionality.  The SMARTEK 
chip bypassed this control and allegedly enabled unauthorized access 
to the PEP.111 
Although the District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky 
granted Lexmark’s request for a preliminary injunction,112 the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals regarded Lexmark’s argument with palpable 
skepticism.  The court eventually concluded that § 1201 did not apply 
to Lexmark’s technology at all.  According to the court, the 
authentication sequence did not control access to the PEP, which was 
neither encrypted nor otherwise protected against literal copying.113  
Because the authentication sequence did not meaningfully control 
access to the code, the DMCA simply did not apply.114 
In Chamberlain Group v. Skylink, the Federal Circuit faced a similar 
theory.115  Chamberlain manufactured the Security+ garage door 
opener (“GDO”) system, which utilized a “rolling code” to modify the 
signal used by Chamberlain’s remote transmitter to activate the 
GDO.116  Skylink marketed universal remotes designed to interoperate 
 
 108 This agreement took the form of a shrink-wrap license on the cartridge 
packaging.  Id. at 530.  Non-prebate cartridges, which were not subject to this 
restriction, could be purchased at a higher price.  Id. 
 109 Each time a printer was turned on, the printer and cartridge initiated an 
authentication sequence whereby each would calculate a code using an encryption 
algorithm.  Id.  If the codes matched, the printer accepted the cartridge and operated 
normally.  Id.  If the authentication sequence failed, the printer would not operate.  Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 
974 (E.D. Ky. 2003).  SCC admitted that its SMARTEK chips avoided or bypassed 
Lexmark’s authentication sequence, and that they were designed to do so.  Id. at 968. 
 113 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 546-47.  Instead, according to the court, access was 
controlled by the purchase of a Lexmark printer.  Id.  
 114 Id. at 548. 
 115 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 116 Id. at 1183. 
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with a variety of GDO systems, including the Security+ line.117  
Chamberlain filed suit, alleging that Skylink’s universal transmitter 
violated the DMCA’s anticircumvention provision.  Under 
Chamberlain’s theory, the rolling code system controlled access to the 
copyrighted code that operated its Security+ GDOs.  By imitating the 
rolling code, Skylink transmitters permitted unauthorized access to 
the software that operated Chamberlain’s GDOs.  The district court 
rejected Chamberlain’s theory, holding that consumers who purchased 
Chamberlain products were entitled to access the GDO software.118 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that Chamberlain customers 
possessed an “inherent legal right to use” the software embedded in 
their GDOs.119  Perhaps more importantly, the court held that to 
maintain an action under § 1201, a plaintiff must establish not only that 
an effective TPM restricts access to a copyrighted work, but that the 
circumvention of that TPM bears some “reasonable relationship to the 
protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords.”120  Because 
consumers were entitled to access the GDO software, Chamberlain was 
unable to prove “the critical nexus between” the access facilitated by 
Skylink’s device and the protection of a legitimate copyright interest.121 
Together Lexmark and Chamberlain placed important limits on the 
scope of anticircumvention liability, but they left some questions 
unresolved.  Lexmark, because of the technical and fact-specific basis of 
its holding, could allow future plaintiffs to succeed under slightly 
different facts.  After all, if Lexmark had restricted access to the PEP 
more fully, perhaps by encrypting the program code, its § 1201 claim 
could have moved forward.  Judge Merritt’s concurrence took pains to 
warn that future litigants could not escape the court’s hostility to similar 
claims through minor variations on the Lexmark facts.122  How such 
permutations will be analyzed by future courts remains to be seen. 
Chamberlain suffers from the opposite problem.  Rather than being 
tied to specific facts, the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement offers 
courts and litigants limited guidance as to the factual and legal 
 
 117 Rather than implementing an identical rolling code sequence, Skylink 
transmitters sent three signals in rapid succession that reset the rolling code sequence 
and activated the opener.  Id. at 1184. 
 118 Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045-46 
(N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 119 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1204. 
 122 See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 551-
52 (6th Cir. 2004) (Merritt, J., concurring). 
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predicates necessary for liability.  Although the Federal Circuit held in 
a subsequent case that a defense under § 117 of the Copyright Act 
undermined the nexus,123 the boundaries of the requirement remain 
largely undefined. 
Lexmark and Chamberlain, although decided on different grounds, 
were motivated by a common set of concerns.  Lingering below the 
surface of both cases were overarching worries over competition and 
interoperability that explain both courts’ eagerness to deny protection 
under § 1201.  Ultimately, Lexmark and Chamberlain had little 
interest in protecting their code from unauthorized access or copying.  
Instead, access to their works served as a convenient predicate for 
DMCA enforcement meant to protect aftermarkets for interoperable 
products.  Both courts worried that by adding fragments of 
copyrighted code to consumer goods, manufacturers could “gain the 
right to restrict consumers’ rights to use [their] products in 
conjunction with competing products.”124  Such power, in turn, could 
“create monopolies of manufactured goods”125 that relied on the 
DMCA to provide “broad exemptions from . . . the antitrust laws.”126 
Despite the role interoperability played in motivating the Lexmark 
and Chamberlain courts, and the fact that § 1201(f) was briefed in 
both cases, neither court relied on the defense nor thoroughly 
analyzed its application.127  The district court in Chamberlain made no 
mention of § 1201(f), and the Federal Circuit declined to reach the 
issue.128  Because the court was satisfied that Chamberlain could not 
prove a prima facie violation of § 1201, the failure to delve into an 
affirmative defense provides little cause for criticism.129 
 
 123 Storage Tech. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g, 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  Section 117 of the Copyright Act provides an exception to infringement 
liability for the creation of copies of computer programs for the purposes of 
maintenance and repair of computer equipment.  See 17 U.S.C. § 117(c) (2006). 
 124 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201. 
 125 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring). 
 126 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1193. 
 127 See Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Ass’n as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Skylink Technologies, Inc., Chamberlain, 381 F.3d 1178 (No. 04-1118); 
Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Static Control 
Components, Inc., Lexmark, 387 F.3d 522 (No. 0305400). 
 128 Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1201 n.15. 
 129 The court continued this silence on § 1201(f) in Storage Technology Corp. v. 
Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
There, the district court held that because the defendant infringed plaintiff’s copyright, 
§ 1201(f) did not apply. Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & 
Consulting, Inc., No. 02-12102, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12391, at *15 (D. Mass. July 2, 
2004).  Although it reversed the infringement holding, the Federal Circuit saw no 
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Lexmark offered some clarification of the independent creation 
requirement of § 1201(f), even if only in dicta.  The Sixth Circuit 
explained that independent creation only requires proof of originality; 
the new program must not infringe the protected program.130  The 
district court’s findings that SCC’s program “serve[d] no legitimate 
purpose other than to circumvent Lexmark’s authentication sequence” 
and contained copies of unprotected Lexmark code were insufficient 
to undermine SCC’s defense.131  In the end, however, Lexmark offered 
no definitive holding on § 1201(f), concluding only that SCC “may 
benefit from the interoperability defense, at least in the preliminary 
injunction context.”132 
Although both courts were reluctant to reach the issue, the facts in 
Lexmark and Chamberlain presented fairly straightforward applications 
of § 1201(f).  SCC and Skylink both sought to circumvent TPMs that 
restricted access to computer programs, clearing the hurdle that 
proved decisive in Reimerdes.  Likewise, both defendants wrote 
interoperable programs that contained original code sufficient to 
qualify as independently created.  Lastly, neither their acts of reverse 
engineering nor the distribution of the resulting tools constituted 
copyright infringement.  
Perhaps most importantly, Lexmark and Chamberlain offered an 
opportunity to clarify the demands of the sole purpose requirement.133  
Certainly, both SCC and Skylink were motivated by a desire to render 
their products interoperable with systems restricted by TPMs.  But this 
motive was in no strict sense their sole purpose.  Interoperability was 
not their ultimate aim, but an instrumental goal.  The sale of ancillary 
products and the undermining of their rivals’ market positions are just 
two examples of the many purposes from which the desire to 
interoperate could flow.  Rather than focus on higher order goals that a 
court may find suspect, the analysis of § 1201(f) should rely on a 
functional investigation of the circumventor’s objective that looks to the 
manner in which the information obtained was used.  This is precisely 
 
need to revisit the interoperability question. 
 130 Likewise, because the Toner Loading Program was not protected, its copying 
did not constitute infringement under § 1201(f)(3).  Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 551.  The 
court rejected two other limitations on § 1201(f) proposed by Lexmark:  (1) any 
independently created programs “must have existed prior to” the acts of reverse 
engineering; and (2) any technological means developed to circumvent must be 
“necessary or absolutely needed” to achieve interoperability.  Id. at 550-51. 
 131 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943, 
974 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
 132 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 550. 
 133 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006). 
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the sort of inquiry the Ninth Circuit undertook in Sega, the case 
Congress expressly intended § 1201(f) to preserve.  Under such an 
analysis, § 1201(f)’s permitted purpose — identifying and analyzing 
program elements necessary for interoperability — can be contrasted 
with the desire to distribute copies of protected works or to identify 
elements necessary for the development of noninteroperable programs.  
Circumventors who make such uses lack the requisite sole purpose. 
No evidence suggests that SCC hoped to develop its own program to 
control the internal operation of printers manufactured by Lexmark or 
any of its competitors.  Nor did Skylink circumvent Chamberlain’s 
rolling code to copy its GDO firmware or create a competing GDO.  In 
both instances, regardless of the downstream motivation of the 
defendants, the sole functional purpose of their reverse engineering 
was to obtain interoperability information. 
Lexmark and Chamberlain, much like Connectix and Bleem, represent 
missed opportunities for courts to counterbalance the 
misinterpretation of § 1201(f) offered in Reimerdes.  Lexmark and 
Chamberlain both articulated meaningful outer boundaries on the 
scope of § 1201.  However, they may have more effectively curbed 
further efforts to restrict interoperability had they squarely addressed 
§ 1201(f).  As discussed below, the absence of clear authority applying 
§ 1201(f) has given rise to subsequent DMCA case law that threatens 
interoperability despite the limits imposed by Lexmark and 
Chamberlain. 
D. The Continuing Threat to Interoperability 
Commentators have rightly praised Lexmark and Chamberlain for 
resisting the expansive interpretation of the DMCA embodied in 
Reimerdes,134 but neither opinion has proven a panacea for the DMCA’s 
restriction of interoperability.  Plaintiffs have continued to view the 
DMCA as a tool to reduce competition from interoperable products, 
and § 1201(f) has become mired in even deeper judicial 
misinterpretation.  However, the inadequacy of anticircumvention’s 
interoperability policy cannot be placed entirely at the feet of the 
courts; some blame rests with the narrow text of § 1201(f). 
 
 134 See, e.g., Burk, supra note 68, at 571 (“The Chamberlain and Lexmark opinions 
radically change the trend begun in Reimerdes . . . .”); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room 
for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1132-34 (2007) (noting 
approvingly explicit recognition of consumer interests in Chamberlain). 
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1. Durable Goods Revisited 
In the wake of Lexmark and Chamberlain, mobile phones emerged as 
the next consumer product subject to specious anticircumvention 
claims.  Just like printers sold cheap in the hope of profits from 
expensive ink, mobile phones are often subsidized by service charges 
recouped over the life of the phone.135  As a result, providers have 
strong incentives to limit the availability of interoperable services. 
Mobile phones contain various programs that enable their many 
functions, including firmware that controls the ability to connect to a 
cellular network.  Carriers typically configure phones to connect only 
to their own network136 and rely on a variety of TPMs to prevent users 
from accessing and reconfiguring firmware to allow connections to 
competing networks.137  Not surprisingly, consumers have been eager 
to overcome these restrictions on the use of interoperable networks, 
and third-party vendors have assisted them.  Through a process 
known as unlocking, consumers and vendors bypass these TPMs to 
enable connections to other networks.  In some instances, unlocking 
involves the input of reverse-engineered numeric codes.138  In other 
cases, end users unlock their phones by deleting both the firmware 
and the associated TPM, then installing new firmware that enables 
connectivity.139 
TracFone is a vendor of prepaid mobile phones, which it sells at a 
loss.140  Once the prepaid minutes included with each phone expire, 
customers can purchase additional minutes from TracFone.  To 
prevent customers from obtaining cheaper service elsewhere, 
TracFone relies on TPMs that prevent connections to competing 
networks.141  TracFone has filed a series of lawsuits alleging violations 
of § 1201 by vendors that unlocked and resold its phones. 
 
 135 See Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMMS. 389, 398-99 (2007). 
 136 See COMMENTS OF THE WIRELESS ALLIANCE & ROBERT PINKERTON 4, 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/comments/granick_wirelessalliance.pdf. 
 137 See id. at 7 (discussing variety of technological means used by carriers). 
 138 See Hearing on Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 40-41 (Mar. 23, 2006), http:// 
www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-mar23.pdf [hereinafter Hearings] 
(testimony of Jennifer Granick and Steven Metalitz). 
 139 See id. 
 140 TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. GSM Group, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1333 (S.D. 
Fla. 2008).  
 141 Id. at 1334.  Apple too has drawn criticism for its use of technological measures 
to require iPhone customers to subscribe to the AT&T network.  See generally Mark 
DeFeo, Unlocking the iPhone:  How Antitrust Law Can Save Consumers from the 
Inadequacies of Copyright Law, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1037 (2008) (noting consumer 
  
2009] Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy 1583 
As the Register of Copyrights recognized in the 2006 DMCA 
Anticircumvention Rulemaking,142 a consumer who unlocks a phone 
to connect to another network is not “engaging in copyright 
infringement or in activity that in any way implicates copyright 
infringement or the interests of the copyright owner.”143  Because 
unlocking is a noninfringing use, mobile phone firmware was included 
in a temporary exemption from the circumvention ban so long as 
unlocking occurs for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a 
wireless network.144 
Nonetheless, this exemption has not deterred TracFone from 
continuing its aggressive pursuit of those who unlock its handsets.  
Indeed, TracFone has prevailed in a string of recent § 1201 cases, only 
one of which even considered the mobile phone exemption.145  In that 
case, the court denied a motion to dismiss notwithstanding the 
exemption because the complaint alleged that the defendants’ purpose 
was not solely wireless network connectivity, but also reselling 
unlocked phones.146 
The court’s unreasonably rigid analysis of the exemption’s sole 
purpose requirement falls into the same trap discussed above in 
connection with § 1201(f).  That requirement does not ask courts to 
peer into the ultimate aim or purpose for which lawful connection to a 
wireless network is sought.  Its drafters intended that language to 
exclude circumvention by those seeking access to ringtones, video 
content, and other copyrighted works stored on mobile phones.147  
 
opposition to Apple’s exclusive arrangement with AT&T and evaluating potential 
antitrust challenges). 
 142 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2006) (empowering Librarian of Congress to 
exempt, on a temporary basis, classes of copyrighted works from anticircumvention 
ban to extent it interferes with noninfringing use of those works). 
 143 RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 50 (Nov. 17, 2006), http:// 
www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/1201_recommendation.pdf [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION]. 
 144 Id. at 50-51. 
 145 See GSM Group, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 (rejecting defense premised on 
unlocking exemption on basis of allegations that defendant’s sole purpose was not 
lawful connection to telephone network); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Bitcell Corp., No. 
07-22249, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41955, at *9 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 2008) (entering 
consent judgment and permanent injunction); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 
F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (granting unopposed permanent injunction 
on basis of both circumvention and trafficking claims); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Sol 
Wireless, No. 05-23279, at 3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.stopcellphonefraud.com/wp-content/uploads/1-tracfone-v-sol-wireless-
group-inc-et-al.pdf (entering stipulated final judgment enjoining unlocking). 
 146 GSM Group, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.  
 147 See Hearings, supra note 138, at 44-46 (testimony of Steven Metalitz). 
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Although the mobile phone exemption should have prevailed over 
TracFone’s circumvention theory, the exemption offered no colorable 
defense to its trafficking claim.148  So even assuming courts apply the 
temporary mobile phone exemption more carefully, trafficking 
allegations could persist. 
TracFone’s litigation strategy suggests that Lexmark and 
Chamberlain did not close the door on the use of the DMCA to 
suppress interoperability, even in markets for consumer electronics 
with embedded software.  As the Copyright Office understood, 
TracFone has no interest in protecting its copyrighted firmware from 
potential infringement.149  Instead, it hopes to protect its business 
model and pricing scheme from competitive forces by preventing 
consumers from connecting to interoperable networks.  TracFone’s 
success has been largely unopposed, with the courts lending their 
imprimatur to private settlement agreements.  It remains far from clear 
whether TracFone’s § 1201 theory will hold up to genuine scrutiny. 
To the extent TracFone alleges that unlockers delete firmware and 
the TPM that protects it, § 1201 appears altogether inapposite.  Read 
literally, the DMCA might prohibit the removal of a TPM regardless of 
whether or not such removal enables access to the underlying work.150  
But where the protected code is neither run nor accessed, but simply 
deleted along with the TPM, none of the interests Congress intended 
to recognize in § 1201 are implicated.  Copyright does not protect 
against the deletion of computer programs, and the DMCA should not 
be read to confer new power over the removal of programs from 
lawfully acquired hardware.  
If instead, unlockers bypass protection measures to gain 
unauthorized access to firmware, the threshold requirements of § 
1201 could be met.  Under appropriate facts, Lexmark and 
Chamberlain may limit liability.151  But TracFone’s success suggests 
 
 148 Although the Copyright Office can exempt certain works from the ban on 
circumvention, its rulemaking authority does not extend to the prohibition on 
trafficking in circumvention devices or services.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (2006).  
See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Evolving Standards and the Future of the DMCA 
Anticircumvention Rulemaking, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1 (2007) (detailing limitations on 
scope of Copyright Office’s rulemaking authority). 
 149 See RECOMMENDATION, supra note 143, at 50. 
 150 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A) (including “remov[al]” of TPM among acts 
considered circumvention). 
 151 Chamberlain relied in part on customers’ “inherent legal right to use” their 
garage door openers, a right unrestricted by any contractual obligations.  Chamberlain, 
381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  But if carriers contractually restrict the ability 
of customers to connect to competing networks, Chamberlain may prove inapplicable.  
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that the limits those cases impose are sufficiently unclear to justify 
settlement by multiple defendants, even if TracFone’s claims are 
ultimately flawed on the merits. 
Section 1201(f) offers unlockers another plausible defense.  
Although unlocking enables interoperability with communications 
networks, those networks are composed of not only base stations and 
radio signals, but also software that controls network 
communications.152  Therefore, the practical effect of unlocking is 
interoperability between mobile phone firmware and other 
independently created programs.  But without applicable precedent, 
courts may be reluctant to apply § 1201(f) to facts that appear, on the 
surface, far from those that Congress anticipated.  As discussed below, 
the opinions that followed Lexmark and Chamberlain did little to 
encourage courts to extend § 1201(f) to those facts or any others. 
2. Davidson:  Re-Misinterpreting § 1201(f) 
Just one year after Lexmark and Chamberlain, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the most extensive and deeply misguided 
analysis of § 1201(f) to date.  Davidson & Associates v. Jung tested the 
application of the DMCA to the development of interoperable services 
for the online play of copyrighted video games.153  While Reimerdes 
introduced considerable uncertainty, Davidson and the district court 
opinion it affirmed threaten to undermine fundamentally § 1201(f) 
through their consistently hostile misinterpretation of the statute.154 
Davidson involved Blizzard, the developer of several multi-player PC 
games.  Blizzard offered an online matchmaking service, Battle.net, 
which allowed players to compete over the Internet.  Battle.net relied 
on a secret handshake with Blizzard games to validate unique CD 
keys.  If the key was invalid or in use by another player, Battle.net 
denied access, preventing the use of infringing copies of Blizzard 
games on the Battle.net server.155 
 
But as the Copyright Office has confirmed, unlocking poses no threat to legitimate 
copyright interests, so the nexus required by Chamberlain appears utterly lacking.  See 
RECOMMENDATION, supra note 143, at 50. 
 152 KAVEH PAHLAVAN & ALLEN H. LEVESQUE, WIRELESS INFORMATION NETWORKS 10 
(2005) (noting role of base stations, radio signals and antennae, and software 
programs in cellular networks). 
 153 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 154 See id. at 640-42; Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 
1164, 1183-85 (E.D. Mo. 2004), aff’d sub nom., 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 155 Davidson, 422 F.3d at 633 nn.2-3. 
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A group of Blizzard enthusiasts, frustrated with certain shortcomings 
of Battle.net, developed an alternative matchmaking service, dubbed 
bnetd, that interoperated with Blizzard games.156  The bnetd project 
reverse engineered the protocols used by Blizzard games to 
communicate with Battle.net and developed a functionally equivalent 
server and software that allowed players to connect to it.157  But because 
bnetd lacked access to Blizzard’s database of CD keys, it was unable to 
ensure that all players used legitimate copies of Blizzard games.158 
Blizzard sued the bnetd team, alleging violations of the 
circumvention and trafficking bans of § 1201.  Blizzard argued that the 
secret handshake controlled access to “Battle.net mode,” the ability to 
play Blizzard games online.159  Bnetd raised § 1201(f) as a defense, 
arguing that any circumvention of Blizzard’s access controls simply 
enabled reverse engineering necessary to render the bnetd server 
software interoperable with Blizzard games.  Any tools bnetd 
distributed that facilitated circumvention, it maintained, were likewise 
intended to enable interoperability.160 
The district court rejected bnetd’s § 1201(f) defense for several 
reasons.  First, the court claimed that bnetd could not rely on § 
1201(f) because it lacked permission to circumvent.  The district court 
appeared to confuse the basic elements of a § 1201 violation with the 
requirements of the interoperability defense, stating that “[t]he 
statute . . . only exempts those who obtained permission to circumvent 
the technological measure.”161  Of course, if bnetd had permission, an 
affirmative defense would be unnecessary. 
Second, the court found that the sole purpose of bnetd’s 
circumvention was not to enable interoperability, but “to avoid the 
anticircumvention restrictions of the game and to avoid the restricted 
 
 156 These complaints included frequent unreliability and widespread cheating.  Id. 
at 635 n.6. 
 157 Id. at 636. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Premising DMCA liability on access to “Battle.net mode” was problematic.  
Neither the district court nor the Eighth Circuit settled on any one description of 
Battle.net mode, suggesting at various turns that it was a component of the game code, 
a part of the Battle.net server, and something in between.  See A.H. Rajani, Note, 
Davidson & Associates v. Jung:  (Re)interpreting Access Controls, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. 
J. 365, 377-78 (2006).  But users of bnetd gained no access to the Battle.net server and 
already had access to the contents of their unencrypted Blizzard game discs. 
 160 Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1183 (E.D. Mo. 
2004), aff’d sub nom., 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 161 Id. at 1185 (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d 
Cir. 2001)).  
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access to Battle.net.”162  If the court meant that bnetd’s purpose for 
circumvention was to circumvent, it is correct.  But this tautology does 
little to resolve the question of the purpose of bnetd’s circumvention.  
The court offered four reasons to suspect bnetd’s motives:  (1) the 
bnetd server did not verify users’ CD keys; (2) the bnetd software was 
distributed for free; (3) bnetd distributed its software in binary form; 
and (4) the bnetd server source code was made available.163  Again, 
rather than probing bnetd’s motives for achieving interoperability, the 
court should have confined its inquiry to the functional purpose of the 
acts of reverse engineering made possible by circumvention.  Bnetd 
did not circumvent in hopes of copying Blizzard’s protected expression 
or creating an infringing game.  The bnetd developers used the 
information they sought solely to create a program that interoperated 
with Blizzard’s games.  Whether bnetd distributed the resulting 
program for free or for profit, with closed or open source, is of little 
consequence.  
Only the first of the court’s reasons points to any plausible basis to 
doubt bnetd’s purpose.164  If bnetd created a tool that achieved 
interoperability but disregarded Blizzard’s efforts to suppress the use 
of infringing copies of its games, perhaps bnetd’s purpose embraced 
not only interoperability but the encouragement of infringement as 
well.  The evidence, however, suggests that any inference drawn 
against bnetd, even on this ground, was unjustified.  The bnetd 
developers requested access to Blizzard’s CD key database to enable 
screening for infringing copies, a request Blizzard denied.165  Blizzard, 
of course, had no obligation to comply, but bnetd’s request is entirely 
consistent with a lawful purpose to enable interoperability. 
Third, the court rejected bnted’s § 1201(f) defense on the grounds 
that the bnetd server was not an independently created computer 
program because it was “intended as a functional alternative to the 
Battle.net service,” one that was indistinguishable from Battle.net from 
the standpoint of users.166  But this functional equivalence simply 
suggests that bnetd was successful in its attempt to enable 
interoperability.  By counting this fact against bnetd, the court 
 
 162 Id. at 1186. 
 163 Id. at 1185. 
 164 Denying protection under § 1201(f) because bnetd distributed its software for 
free is particularly inappropriate.  The court could just as easily have imputed impure 
motives to bnetd for profiting from its interoperable software. 
 165 See Letter from Cindy A. Cohn to Rod Rigole (Mar. 11, 2002), 
http://www.eff.org/pages/eff-letter-blizzard-vivendi.  
 166 Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
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betrayed a deep misunderstanding of the activities § 1201(f) was 
meant to privilege.  Moreover, the court ignored clear congressional 
intent.  Independent creation requires only that “[t]he resulting 
product . . . be a new and original work, in that it may not infringe the 
original computer program.”167  As the court should have understood, 
the fact that the two servers were functionally interchangeable did not 
establish infringement. 
This failure to analyze any supposed infringement was central in the 
court’s fourth reason for rejecting bnetd’s defense.  According to the 
court, “the development and distribution to others [of the bnetd 
software] constituted copyright infringement,” violating the final 
requirement of § 1201(f).168  But the court articulated no theory, much 
less an analysis, of copyright infringement.  The bnetd software, 
although functionally equivalent to the Battle.net server, does not 
appear to have copied any of its code.  Nor does the record support a 
finding of infringement based on copying of any Blizzard games.  
Without any infringement analysis, the court’s conclusion, that bnetd 
could not avail itself of the § 1201(f) defense as a result of its 
supposed acts of infringement, is entirely unfounded.  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit failed to improve upon the district 
court’s mangled reading of § 1201(f).  Instead, it introduced further 
confusion.  The court rejected bnetd’s defense on the grounds that its 
circumvention constituted infringement because unauthorized copies 
of Blizzard games could be played on the bnetd server.169  As an initial 
matter, the court was wrong to ask whether the circumvention was an 
act of infringement.  The relevant question is whether the acts of 
identification and analysis enabled by circumvention, or the 
subsequent sharing of information and tools that enable 
circumvention, were acts of infringement.  Here the Eighth Circuit 
may have confused § 1201(f)’s reference to “infringement” — the 
unauthorized exercise of the exclusive rights defined in § 106 of the 
Copyright Act — with a violation of § 1201.  However, if 
“infringement” referred to § 1201 violations, qualifying for the 
interoperability defense would be a logical impossibility because acts 
of infringement are a bar to a § 1201(f) defense.   
These flaws aside, the fact that some users connected to the bnetd 
server using unauthorized copies of Blizzard games does not prove 
that bnetd infringed Blizzard’s copyrights.  Unless bnetd’s reverse 
 
 167 S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 32 (1998). 
 168 Davidson, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. 
 169 Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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engineering entailed unfair copying or its software tools contained 
infringing expression, the court lacked any justification for its 
conclusory finding of infringement.  The Eighth Circuit’s opinion 
simply contains no analysis to support its pronouncement of 
infringement. 
The district court’s struggle in Davidson to make sense of the basic 
elements of § 1201(f), coupled with the Eighth Circuit’s disinterest in 
an independent analysis, leave developers of interoperable 
technologies in an unenviable position.  Aside from the Sixth Circuit’s 
nonbinding receptiveness to § 1201(f) in Lexmark, defendants can 
point to no favorable interpretations of the defense.  As a result, even 
defendants who fall squarely within the protections for reverse 
engineering and interoperability created by Congress face considerable 
uncertainty.  Judicial misinterpretation, however, explains only part of 
the failure of § 1201(f).  Congress’s choice to limit the exemption’s 
scope to computer programs ensures that the statute cannot insulate 
all interoperable technologies from liability. 
3. The Shortcomings of § 1201(f) 
The text of § 1201(f) reflects the legislative compromise responsible 
for its enactment.  The exemption tempered the nearly unlimited 
anticircumvention provisions favored by the entertainment industry, 
but gave advocates of reverse engineering and interoperability fewer 
safeguards than they might have preferred.  Reverse engineers who 
extract uncopyrightable processes and principles to create 
noninteroperable products are not privileged under § 1201(f).170  Nor 
are researchers who investigate the operation of TPMs, their 
effectiveness, and their implications for security and privacy.171  
 
 170 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 43 (1998) (“If a person makes this 
information available for a purpose other than to achieve interoperability . . . then 
such action is a violation of this Act.”). 
 171 Sections 1201(g) and (j), the encryption research and security testing 
exemptions, offer researchers some protection under narrowly defined circumstances.  
For a discussion of the impact of § 1201(g) on encryption research, see generally 
Joseph P. Liu, The DMCA and the Regulation of Scientific Research, 18 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 501 (2003) (arguing that academic encryption research should be allowed under 
DMCA).  Even outside of the encryption context, TPM research can offer significant 
benefits to the public.  As the Sony BMG rootkit incident made clear, TPMs can cause 
serious security and privacy threats best discovered and exposed by independent 
researchers.  See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Aaron K. Perzanowski, The Magnificence of the 
Disaster:  Reconstructing the Sony BMG Rootkit Incident, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 
1232 (2007).  More recently, DRM employed on PC video games has given rise to 
similar concerns.  See Comment of J. Alex Halderman, In the Matter of Exemption to 
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Aside from its failure to accommodate reverse engineering for other 
legitimate purposes, § 1201(f) does not embrace all interoperable 
technologies.  Section 1201(f) permits the circumvention of 
technological measures that protect computer programs, but not 
“works generally, such as music or audiovisual works . . . distributed 
in digital form.”172  As a result, interoperable products that make use 
of technologically protected entertainment content or other works are 
open to attack under the DMCA. 
The disparity in the treatment of these two classes of interoperable 
technologies is the result of two problematic distinctions.  First, this 
inequality relies on a clear division between technological measures 
that protect computer programs and those that protect other 
copyrighted works.  Second, it relies on a distinction between program 
interoperability and data interoperability.  Both distinctions are the 
product of factual oversimplifications, and neither supports exempting 
one class of interoperable technologies while subjecting the other to 
DMCA liability. 
TPMs cannot be neatly divided between those that restrict the use of 
entertainment content and those that control the use of computer 
programs.  Frequently, the same TPM serves both functions.  An early 
§ 1201 dispute, RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., illustrates the 
difficulty in drawing such distinctions.  RealNetworks (“Real”) 
developed technology for streaming audio and video files encoded in 
its RealMedia formats.  Real used a “secret handshake” between its 
RealServer and RealPlayer client to ensure that third-party applications 
could not stream RealMedia files.  If an application requesting a file 
from RealServer did not execute the handshake, access was denied.173 
Real obtained a preliminary injunction against Streambox, 
developers of the VCR, an application that mimicked the secret 
handshake to interoperate with RealServer.  The court found that the 
handshake served as an effective access control, one the VCR 
circumvented by mimicking RealPlayer.174  The key question the 
RealPlayer presented, however, was not whether the handshake 
 
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control 
Technologies, Docket No. RM 2008­8, at 5-6, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/ 
comments/halderman-reid.pdf (describing risks associated with Macrovision’s 
SafeDisc and Sony’s SecuROM technologies). 
 172 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 33; see also Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 
35, at 1635 n.289 (noting that § 1201(f) does not extend to program-to-data 
interoperability). 
 173 RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1889, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000). 
 174 Id. at *19-20. 
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restricted access, but rather, to what copyrighted works it restricted 
access.  Although the court correctly found that the handshake 
restricted access to RealMedia files, it also restricted access to the 
RealServer application.  Without authentication, users were unable to 
access that portion of the RealServer that enabled streaming.  To 
prevent access to RealMedia files, Real simultaneously limited access 
to the RealServer software.  To the extent that TPMs restrict access to 
both entertainment content and computer programs, the clean 
distinctions presupposed by the DMCA are difficult to draw.175  
The Streambox litigation also illustrates the second problematic 
distinction at work in § 1201(f).  The StreamboxVCR ignored Real’s 
“Copy Switch,” a bit of code that reflected copyright holder 
preferences about end user copying.  As a result, Streambox could 
have faced difficulty in establishing that interoperability was its sole 
purpose under § 1201(f).176  But setting aside that fact, consider a 
hypothetical application that interoperated with the RealServer and 
fully complied with the copy switch:  one that functioned exactly like 
RealPlayer and presented precisely the same risk of infringement.  
Because the handshake restricted access to entertainment content, § 
1201(f) would have been unavailable. 
The unavailability of § 1201(f) in such circumstances ignores the 
role of data in enabling interoperable relationships, hampering § 
1201(f)’s ability to accommodate interoperability fully.177  While 
interoperability sometimes depends on access to a computer program, 
it may depend on the ability to extract interoperability information 
from data created or used by that application.  When access to these 
inputs and outputs is restricted, interoperability suffers. 
Even the definition of interoperability in § 1201(f) — “the ability of 
computer programs to exchange information, and of such programs 
mutually to use the information which has been exchanged” — 
 
 175 The text and legislative history of § 1201(f) are clear that the defense was meant 
to apply to TPMs that restrict access to computer programs and not to those that restrict 
access to digital media.  The status of dual purpose TPMs — those that simultaneously 
restrict access to both types of works — is ambiguous as a textual matter.  However, the 
DMCA’s definitional focus on program-to-program interoperability strongly suggests 
that circumvention that aims to enable interoperability between a program and data or 
media would not be privileged under § 1201(f). 
 176 Unlike in Davidson, no evidence suggests that Streambox made any effort to 
comply with the copy switch. 
 177 See URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, DRM-PROTECTED MUSIC INTEROPERABILITY AND 
EINNOVATION 21 (2007), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law. 
harvard.edu/files/interop-drm-music_0.pdf. 
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reflects an undue focus on program-level interoperability.178  Under 
Congress’s definition, computer programs exhaust the class of 
potentially interoperable objects.  Had Congress embraced a broader 
system-level view of interoperability, rather than drawing a bright line 
between programs and data, it may have recognized that both 
programs and data are system components capable of enabling 
interoperability. 
Congress’s focus on program-level interoperability has two related 
explanations.  First, the content industry, concerned that broad 
exemptions would undo § 1201’s prohibitions, opposed the adoption 
or expansion of proposed exemptions.179  Second, the software 
industry, the primary proponent of § 1201(f), had finite influence.  
The software industry focused its efforts on maintaining the ability to 
access other programs for reverse engineering, a practice central to 
prevailing industry practices.  Data interoperability presented a less 
pressing concern to software developers, and by extension, Congress. 
The distinction between program and data interoperability, while 
explicable as a matter of legislative process, is deeply problematic.  
The definition of “computer program” provided by the Copyright Act 
hints, albeit unintentionally, at the difficulty of drawing inflexible 
distinctions between program and data.  Section 101 defines a 
computer program as “a set of statements or instructions to be used 
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain 
result.”180  Of course, the result experienced by a user of digital 
content is brought about by instructions contained in both the 
application and the data file. 
A hard and fast distinction between program and data is particularly 
inappropriate with respect to § 1201(f) for two additional reasons.  
Congress explicitly intended the interoperability exemption to 
preserve Sega.  The Sega court permitted the reverse engineering of 
video games — works that straddle the line between computer 
programs and digital entertainment content.  Further, files distributed 
in TPM-restricted formats exhibit program-like characteristics.  Those 
files contain functional instructions distinct from the movies or music 
 
 178 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(4) (2006). 
 179 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2281 Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecommunications, 
Trade, and Consumer Protection, 105th Cong. 7-8 (June 5, 1998) (testimony of Steven 
J. Metalitz), available at http://www.hrrc.org/File/June5-98Hearing.pdf (describing “a 
host of additional amendments . . . to narrow the anti-circumvention provisions” that 
were “not absolutely necessary . . . and that cut back on the rights of copyright 
owners” as “not . . . especially popular with the MPAA or its member companies”). 
 180 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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they encode.  Files in TPM-restricted formats contain instructions that 
control the ability of other programs or devices to interoperate. 
Ultimately, the distinction between data and program 
interoperability cannot justify the stark differences that distinction 
creates in the scope of DMCA protection.  As a more recent dispute 
makes clear, the narrow language of § 1201(f) furnishes providers of 
TPM-restricted content unprecedented control over playback 
technologies. 
Several years after its litigation against Streambox, RealNetworks 
was at the center of another interoperability controversy, this time as 
the alleged circumventor.  Apple’s iPod is the world’s most popular 
portable music player, and its iTunes store is the top music retailer in 
the United States.181  The only digital rights management (“DRM”) 
technology supported by the iPod is Apple’s FairPlay.  Real’s 
competing download service utilized its own Helix DRM technology.  
Thus, music purchased from Real could not be played back on the 
iPod.182  Given the iPod’s popularity, Real’s customers demanded 
compatibility. 
Real proposed a tactical alliance, under which Apple would license 
Real’s use of FairPlay, and Real would promote the iPod to its 
customers.183  Apple declined.184  Months later, determined to enable 
iPod interoperability, Real announced a technology called Harmony 
that converted Real’s Helix-protected files into a format that 
successfully mimicked FairPlay.185  Real touted Harmony as a boon for 
“[c]ompatibility, choice and quality” that “follow[ed] in a well-
established tradition of fully legal, independently developed” 
interoperable technologies.186  Apple responded by accusing Real of 
“adopt[ing] the tactics and ethics of a hacker to break into the 
 
 181 See Eric Bangeman, Apple Passes Wal-mart, Now #1 Music Retailer in US, ARS 
TECHNICA, Apr. 2, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080402-apple-passes-
wal-mart-now-1-music-retailer-in-us.html; Arik Hesseldahl, A Real Rival for Apple’s 
iPod?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 19, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ 
content/sep2006/tc20060918_036885.htm.  
 182 See John Borland, RealNetworks Breaks Apple’s Hold on iPod, CNET, July 26, 
2004, http://news.cnet.com/RealNetworks-breaks-Apples-hold-on-iPod/2100-1027_3-
5282063.html. 
 183 See Geoff Duncan, Apple Refuses to Sing with Real’s Harmony, TidBITS, Aug. 2, 
2004, http://db.tidbits.com/article/7756. 
 184 See id. 
 185 Press Release, RealNetworks Statement About Harmony Technology and 
Creating Consumer Choice (July 29, 2004), http://realnetworks.com/company/press/ 
releases/2004/harmony_statement.html. 
 186 Id. 
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iPod.”187  Apple then threatened both legal action under the DMCA 
and technological self-help to disrupt Harmony.188 
Ultimately, Apple relied on the latter option.  A few months after the 
release of Harmony, Apple updated its iTunes software to block the 
use of converted Real files.189  Nonetheless, Real eventually achieved 
iPod interoperability.  It did so not by reverse engineering or licensing 
FairPlay, but by selling mp3 files unencumbered by DRM and 
compatible with all portable players, including the iPod.190 
Because Apple did not file suit against Real, it never clearly 
articulated its DMCA theory.  Harmony enabled Real customers to 
access music protected with its own Helix DRM on the iPod; it did not 
enable them to access music purchased from iTunes and protected 
with FairPlay.  Thus, an argument that Real trafficked in a tool that 
enabled unauthorized access to iTunes content was a non-starter.  
However, Apple may have contended that FairPlay restricted access 
not to iTunes music, but to the iPod’s embedded software.  In the 
ordinary course of operation, iPod users could access the playback 
software on their iPod only if they loaded unencrypted or FairPlay-
protected files on the device.  By mimicking FairPlay, Apple could 
have argued, Harmony enabled unauthorized access to software 
embedded on the iPod. 
Although the connection to potential infringement is arguably more 
substantial than in Chamberlain, a court so inclined could have rejected 
Apple’s claim based on the Federal Circuit’s nexus requirement.  The act 
of accessing the iPod’s software to play lawfully purchased content 
creates little, if any, risk of infringement.  Likewise, a court could have 
held that users were authorized to access the iPod’s software by virtue of 
purchasing the device.  More importantly, to the extent that Apple 
characterized its DRM as restricting access to the iPod software, it 
opened the door to a § 1201(f) defense, a defense Real stressed in its 
response to Apple’s threats.  In short, a DMCA theory premised on 
unauthorized access to the iPod faced substantial difficulties. 
Apple’s more plausible claim would have alleged that Real’s reverse 
engineering during the creation of Harmony circumvented FairPlay, 
 
 187 Apple Statement (July 29, 2004), http://prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl? 
ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/07-29-2004/0002221065. 
 188 Id. 
 189 See John Borland, Apple Fights RealNetworks’ ‘Hacker Tactics’, CNET, Dec. 14, 
2004, http://news.cnet.com/2102-1027_3-5490604.html.  
 190 See Arnold Kim, Rhapsody Relaunches with iPod-Compatible MP3s, MACRUMORS, 
June 30, 2008, http://www.macrumors.com/2008/06/30/rhapsody-relaunches-with-
ipod-compatible-mp3s. 
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resulting in unauthorized access to iTunes music.  If such 
circumvention occurred,191 a § 1201(f) defense would face major 
challenges.  Although Real’s reverse engineering was intended to enable 
interoperability between its system and the iPod, the protections of § 
1201(f) would be unavailable under the prevailing reading because 
FairPlay restricted access to entertainment content, not iPod software.192  
Likewise, Lexmark would have been of limited value to Real.  FairPlay, 
unlike the TPM at issue in Lexmark, utilized encryption to control 
effectively access to the underlying copyrighted material.  
The Chamberlain framework represented Real’s strongest potential 
defense.  To the extent Real circumvented FairPlay solely for reverse 
engineering purposes, an act squarely within the fair use privilege 
under Sega, any nexus between circumvention and infringement 
would appear to be lacking.  But a number of considerations suggest 
that the success of such a defense would have been far from certain.  
First, although the Federal Circuit has relied on statutory defenses — 
namely the maintenance and repair provisions of § 117193 — to 
disconfirm the required nexus, it has not explicitly held that the 
notoriously context-dependent fair use defense would apply with 
equal force.  Second, while at least one district court has followed the 
Federal Circuit’s Chamberlain framework, no other Courts of Appeals 
have yet adopted Chamberlain.194  Third, Chamberlain’s hostility to the 
 
 191 Real claimed it developed Harmony using only publicly available information, 
suggesting that circumvention was unnecessary.  Indeed, Real may have created 
Harmony by reverse engineering existing FairPlay circumvention tools.  See Posting of 
Ernest Miller to Corante, http://importance.corante.com/archives/005301.php (July 
26, 2004, 17:52 EST). 
 192 The hurdles facing a § 1201(f) defense in the context of digital media 
interoperability can be contrasted with the greater likelihood of success of that same 
defense in the context of iPhone application interoperability.  Apple tightly controls 
the applications authorized for use on the iPhone.  Low-level cryptographic checks 
ensure that the iPhone operating system has not been altered and that all installed 
applications have been approved.  Developers unable or unwilling to obtain Apple’s 
approval for their applications, as well as the users of such applications, must rely on 
“jailbreaking” — the process of reconfiguring the iPhone to run unapproved code.  
Apple maintains that this activity violates § 1201.  See Responsive Comment of Apple 
Inc., In the Matter of Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright 
Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, Docket No. RM 2008-8, at 26, 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/apple-inc-31.pdf.  But because the 
TPMs at issue are designed to restrict access to computer programs, the threshold 
requirement of § 1201(f) is satisfied.  Although the other elements of the defense, 
most importantly the sole purpose requirement, must also be met, jailbreakers enjoy a 
reasonable likelihood of success under § 1201(f). 
 193 See supra note 123. 
 194 See Agfa Monotype Corp. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034 (N.D. 
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DMCA claims at issue stem in part from the incongruity of using a 
statute enacted to protect digital media content to gain exclusivity 
over household appliances.  Because the digital music protected by 
FairPlay is much nearer to the core concerns Congress intended to 
address with the DMCA, courts may have been reluctant to apply 
Chamberlain in this context.  
Section 1201(f), the DMCA’s primary legislative safeguard for 
interoperability, has proven inadequate.  The Chamberlain and 
Lexmark decisions, while placing important limits on the scope of 
DMCA protection, offer developers of interoperable technologies 
insufficient assurance in the digital media context.  In response, 
developers and advocates of interoperable technologies have turned to 
other legal frameworks to resist the restrictions on interoperability 
enabled by the DMCA.  Not surprisingly, given the potential 
competitive implications of the DMCA, antitrust has emerged as the 
preferred means of externally restraining the power afforded by § 1201 
over interoperable technologies.  The next Part examines both the 
efficacy and desirability of this approach. 
III. ANTITRUST & INTEROPERABILITY 
Because the DMCA is ill equipped to address fully its interference 
with interoperability, consumers, competitors, and regulators have 
looked to antitrust law to limit the control TPMs yield over 
interoperable technologies.  This Part considers recent efforts to use 
antitrust principles to lower the barriers facing unauthorized 
interoperable products, taking the controversy surrounding Apple’s 
DRM technology as a useful test case for gauging the role antitrust is 
likely to play in this arena.  Although antitrust remedies — notably, 
mandatory disclosure of technical information — could facilitate 
interoperability, antitrust law may not offer an ideal set of tools for 
correcting the DMCA’s impact.  Whether their activities are 
characterized as tying, denial of essential facilities, or refusal to deal, 
firms that rely on TPMs to impede interoperability appear unlikely to 
face consistent antitrust enforcement efforts.  Given the deference 
antitrust law typically affords to the lawful exercise of legitimately 
acquired IP rights,195 antitrust appears unlikely to disturb the 
enforcement of the broad grants provided by the DMCA. 
 
Ill. 2005) (adopting Chamberlain framework). 
 195 Reliance on antitrust to enable interoperability has practical implications as 
well.  To the extent that it is less subject to capture than the IP legislative process, 
antitrust may be well suited to balance the value of creative incentives against the 
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A. Mandating Disclosure 
The mandatory disclosure of interoperability information is not an 
uncommon antitrust remedy.  U.S. antitrust authorities, and their 
European counterparts, have required parties to license or disclose 
information to enable the development of competing and interoperable 
products.196  The cases against Microsoft in the U.S. and Europe provide 
recent examples of mandatory disclosures of interoperability 
information.  In its settlement with the United States, Microsoft agreed 
to disclose communications protocols and application programming 
interfaces.197  In Europe, Microsoft was required to disclose protocol 
specifications that enabled interoperability between Windows and work 
group server operating systems.198 
 
value of a robust public domain.  See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Innovation and the 
Domain of Competition Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV. 103, 117 (2008).  In addition, antitrust 
allows for forward-looking remedies that may guard against technological efforts to 
disrupt interoperability.  On the other hand, these ongoing remedial structures could 
pose administrability problems for courts.  See Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004);  see also Phillip Areeda, Essential 
Facilities:  An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989) 
(arguing that “when compulsory access requires the court to assume the day-to-day 
controls characteristic of a regulatory agency,” no antitrust remedy should be 
available).  Speed is the most important practical downside of relying on antitrust to 
promote interoperability.  An IP regime that favors reverse engineering would afford 
developers immediate self-help, whereas years may pass before an antitrust remedy 
could be put in place.  See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and IP Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 551-52 (2003) (arguing that speed of reverse engineering self-
help renders it preferable to antitrust conduct remedy). 
 196 See, e.g., Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 
1998) (granting preliminary injunction requiring disclosure of technical information), 
vacated on other grounds, 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also In re Silicon 
Graphics, Inc., No. 951-0064, 1995 FTC LEXIS 159, at *18-19 (Federal Trade 
Commission, June 13, 1995) (requiring respondent to port computer games optimized 
for computing platforms, and requiring publication of APIs for interoperability 
purposes); In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364, 373-80 (1975) (requiring licensing of 
patents and disclosure of related know-how).  As part of a 1984 undertaking with the 
European Commission, IBM agreed to disclose interface information to enable 
hardware and software interoperability.  See F.M. Scherer, Microsoft and IBM in 
Europe, 84 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 65 (Jan. 23, 2003). 
 197 United States v. Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2000) (requiring 
disclosure of “APIs, Communications Interfaces and Technical Information” used to 
enabled interoperability); see also United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 76862, at *10-11 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2007) (Modified Final Judgment); 
United States v. Microsoft, 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 186-95 (D.D.C. 2002) (approving 
settlement agreement containing provisions for mandatory disclosure of 
interoperability information).   
 198 Commission Decision, COMP/C-3/37.792, Art. 5(a) (Mar. 24, 2004); Case T-
201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. 249. 
  
1598 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:1549 
Recently, Apple emerged as the new preferred target of antitrust and 
competition scrutiny.  In 2004, around the time Real released 
Harmony, French download service Virgin Mega filed a complaint 
under European competition law alleging that Apple abused its 
dominant position by refusing to license FairPlay.199  Virgin sought 
mandatory disclosure of the FairPlay system in exchange for a 
reasonable royalty.  According to Virgin, Apple leveraged its 
dominance in the market for portable players into the music download 
market by precluding interoperability by other download services, 
denying competitors allegedly indispensable access to the iPod.  The 
French Competition Authority (“FCA”) rejected Virgin’s argument, 
noting that the market for portable players was competitive and that 
only a small percentage of downloaded music was transferred to such 
devices.200  Perhaps more importantly, the FCA pointed out that 
customers could easily convert TPM-restricted files purchased from 
Virgin to an iPod-compatible format by burning them to CD, and then 
importing those CDs using iTunes.201 
Because existing competition law did not prohibit Apple’s refusal to 
share its FairPlay technology, the French Parliament pursued a 
legislative effort to ensure iPod interoperability.  In 2006, France 
enacted the loi relative au Driot d’Auteur et aux Droits Voisins dans la 
Societe de l’Information (“Dadvsi”) to implement the European 
Copyright Directive and, by extension, the WIPO Copyright Treaty.202  
Although Dadvsi created DMCA-like prohibitions against the 
circumvention of effective TPMs, it also required TPM providers to 
disclose information, including technical documentation and program 
interfaces, to developers of interoperable products.203  Dadvsi also 
 
 199 For a detailed discussion, see generally Giuseppe Mazziotti, Did Apple’s Refusal 
to License Proprietary Information Enabling Interoperability with its iPod Music Player 
Constitute an Abuse Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty?, BERKELEY CTR. FOR LAW & TECH. 
2005, http://works.bepress.com/mazziotti/1 (discussing 2004 French Competition 
Authority decision regarding Apple’s refusal to license proprietary technology and 
risks of compulsory licensing to incentive model of IP rights). 
 200 See Conseil de la Concurrence, Decision No. 04-D-54, at 17-18 (Nov. 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.conseil-concurrence.fr/pdf/avis/04d54.pdf. 
 201 Id. at 14. 
 202 Law No. 2006-961 of Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://droit.org/jo/ 
20060803/MCCX0300082L.html [hereinafter Dadvsi] (Law on Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights in the Information Society).  For a discussion of the debate 
leading to the enactment of Dadvsi, see generally Deana Sobel, Note, A Bite out of 
Apple? iTunes, Interoperability, and France’s Dadvsi Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 267 
(2007) (discussing Dadvsi, its attempt to reconcile IP rights with consumer rights, and 
government regulation of interoperability). 
 203 Code de la Propriete Intellectuelle, Article L. 331-5 and 331-7, available at 
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created the Regulatory Authority for Technical Measures to hear 
disputes over TPM interoperability, thus bypassing the FCA, which 
had endorsed Apple’s DRM strategy.204 
Apple dubbed the interoperability provisions of Dadvsi “state 
sponsored piracy.”205  But France was not alone in its efforts to 
increase interoperability between iPods and competing music services.  
The Dutch Consumer Ombudsman filed a complaint with competition 
authorities.206  And the Norwegian Ombudsman found that iTunes 
imposed unreasonable terms and conditions on users, in part because 
of the absence of interoperability with other offerings.207  Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, and Sweden also threatened action over Apple’s 
restriction of interoperability.208 
In the U.S., antitrust authorities have proven more sanguine about 
Apple’s DRM strategy.  At the height of European scrutiny, Thomas 
Barnett, Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice, expressed skepticism about the role of antitrust 
enforcement in promoting interoperability between Apple’s offerings 
and those of its competitors.209  Although U.S. antitrust authorities 
have declined to pursue enforcement actions against Apple, private 
plaintiffs have not.  Two pending class action complaints allege that 
Apple’s refusal to license its FairPlay DRM technology and its 
 
http://www.celog.fr/cpi/.  Publication of the source code of an interoperable product is 
prohibited if it would “seriously undermine the security and effectiveness” of the 
TPM, creating potential difficulties for developers of open source software that 
interacts with TPM-restricted content.  Id. 
 204 See Dadvsi, supra note 202, at art. 14. 
 205 See Michael Geist, The Legal Limits of Government Tinkering With Technology, 
Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=1211. 
 206 See Jan Libbenga, Dutch Consumer Chief Puts Apple Through the Mill, THE 
REGISTER, Jan. 25, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/25/dutch_out_of_tune_ 
with_apple/. 
 207 Letter from Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman to iTunes at 8-10 (May 30, 
2006), www.forbrukerombudet.no/asset/2406/1/2406_1.pdf. 
 208 See Tom Braithewaite & Kevin Allison, Crunch Time for Apple’s Music Icon, FIN. 
TIMES, June 13, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/21682106-faff-11da-b4d0-0000779e2340. 
html; Forbrukerombudet, European Consumer Organisations Join Forces in Legal Dispute 
over iTunes Music Store, Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/ 
index.gan?id=11037079&subid=0.  But European regulators were placated by Apple’s 
decision to sell music without TPM restrictions, capable of playback on a wide variety of 
portable players.  See Forbrukerombudet, Interesting Signals from Apple Regarding iTunes, 
Feb. 8, 2007, http://www.forbrukerombudet.no/index.gan?id=11037506. 
 209 See Thomas O. Barnett, Address at the George Mason University School of Law 
Symposium:  Interoperability Between Antitrust and IP 9-14 (Sept. 13, 2006), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/218316.pdf. 
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unwillingness to support competing DRM systems constitute 
anticompetitive conduct.210  As discussed below however, there are 
good reasons to doubt whether antitrust provides a reliable tool for 
counteracting the DMCA’s restriction of interoperability. 
B. Questioning the Sufficiency of Antitrust Theories 
Firms that rely on the legal enforcement of technological restrictions 
to suppress interoperability face potential antitrust claims based on 
three theories:  tying, essential facilities, or refusal to deal.  As 
discussed below however, all three of these theories face significant 
hurdles that call into question their ability to counteract consistently 
the power over interoperability conferred by the DMCA.  
Rather than analyze the potential application of these theories in the 
abstract, this subpart will consider claims arising out of Apple’s 
allegedly anticompetitive use of its FairPlay DRM.  In many respects, 
Apple is an attractive target for antitrust plaintiffs and an ideal test 
case.  Apple dominates the markets for both portable media players 
and licensed music downloads — commanding market shares above 
seventy percent in both sectors.211  Even assuming, however, that 
Apple has market power, it is far from clear that its DRM strategy 
violates U.S. antitrust law.  
1. Tying 
A tying arrangement is “an agreement by a party to sell one product 
but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or 
tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product 
from any other supplier.”212  A per se tying claim requires proof of a tie 
between two separate products offered by a defendant with sufficient 
 
 210 Tucker v. Apple, 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Slattery v. 
Apple, No. 05-0037, 2005 WL 2204981, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2005).  The 
antitrust complaints lodged against Apple have targeted a number of its business 
practices, only some of which implicate the DMCA.  Apple’s decision, for example, to 
disable support for Microsoft’s WMA format, while potentially relevant to an antitrust 
inquiry, is not an exercise of any power Apple wields as a result of the protections 
afforded by the DMCA. 
 211 See Beleaguered Creative Reports Loss; Seeks to Boost Sales with Apple iPod 
Accessories, MACDAILYNEWS, May 2, 2007, http://www.macdailynews.com/index.php/ 
weblog/comments/13492; Rhapsody to Challenge Apple’s iTunes with MP3 Download 
Service, MAIL ONLINE, June 30, 2008, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
1030486/Rhapsody-challenge-Apples-iTunes-MP3-download-service.html. 
 212 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992) 
(quoting N. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)). 
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economic power in the tying product market to affect a substantial 
volume of commerce anticompetitively in the tied market.213 
Apple faces two potential tying claims:  first, that it forces iPod 
customers to purchase digital music from iTunes; second, that iTunes 
customers are required to purchase an iPod to playback digital media.  
Neither of these scenarios presents a tying arrangement in the classical 
sense.  Apple does not condition the sale of either product, explicitly 
or implicitly, on the sale of the other.  A customer who wants to buy 
an iPod without ever spending a dollar at the iTunes store can do so.  
Likewise, customers are free to purchase music from iTunes without 
buying an iPod.  
But the fact that the two products can be purchased independently 
is, in itself, insufficient to overcome a tying claim.214  Tying can occur 
if a customer purchases the tied product in response to some 
illegitimate use of the leverage acquired through the seller’s power 
over the tying product.  Here, the theory goes, customers are free to 
buy either half of the iPod/iTunes combination without the other, but 
those who do so are denied the full value of their purchases.  
Customers who buy an iPod, but refuse to use iTunes, are unable to 
play licensed downloads on their device.  Further, customers cannot 
play music purchased from the iTunes store on a portable device that 
is not an iPod.  As a result, Apple “refuses to accommodate those who 
prefer one without the other.”215  
Both of these tying theories are factually flawed.  The notion that 
using the iPod to play licensed downloads requires customers to 
purchase content from the iTunes store is belied by the available 
alternatives.  Setting aside the fact that the vast majority of music on 
iPods originates from either existing CD collections or illicit 
downloads, a variety of licensed download services are compatible 
with the iPod.  eMusic, founded in 1998, is the second largest digital 
music retailer and exclusively sells DRM-free mp3 files.216  Although 
eMusic’s four million-track library focuses on independent labels,217 
retailers including Amazon, Real, Napster, and Walmart offer DRM-
free downloads from both independent and major labels.218 
 
 213 See id. at 462. 
 214 See id. 
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Similarly, the claim that Apple forces iTunes customers to buy an 
iPod to make use of purchased digital content overstates the case.  
Customers are, of course, free to listen to purchased content using a 
Windows or Mac computer.  But even restricting the inquiry to use on 
a portable player, iTunes customers can easily and legally convert 
FairPlay-protected tracks to DRM-free mp3 files.219  Recently, in 
response to European critics and customers, Apple has replaced nearly 
all of the Fairplay-restricted music in the iTunes catalog with DRM-
free files that consumers can play on a host of portable devices.220 
The ability to play iTunes tracks on other devices not only 
undermines the notion of a tie between iTunes and the iPod, but also 
figures in the analysis of the essential facilities doctrine discussed below. 
2. Essential Facilities 
Another line of attack against Apple’s tight control over 
interoperability characterizes access to the iPod and iTunes store as 
competitive necessities for rivals.  A monopolist that refuses a 
competitor feasible access to an essential facility that cannot be 
reasonably duplicated faces liability under § 2 of the Sherman Act.221  
Although the essential facilities doctrine developed out of early 
Supreme Court precedent,222 the Court has recently cast doubt on its 
vitality.223  Some commentators have called for the doctrine’s 
 
INTERNETNEWS.COM, June 30, 2008, http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/article.php/ 
3756246. 
 219 The process of burning a CD copy and then importing that CD does impose 
some degree of inconvenience and may result in some discernible loss of audio 
quality. 
 220 See Apple.com, Changes Coming to the iTunes Store (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html.  Television programs, music 
videos, and motion pictures available through iTunes, however, still rely on FairPlay, 
as do iPhone applications. 
 221 See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 
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controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or 
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 222 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973); United 
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1912). 
 223 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 410-11 (2004) (suggesting that Court has never recognized essential facilities 
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abandonment,224 and even some of its supporters caution against 
applying it to IP.225 
Assuming the doctrine represents a distinct monopolization theory 
— as most lower courts do — and that Apple has monopoly power in 
the relevant markets,226 potential plaintiffs must first identify the 
essential facility to which Apple controls access.  Music retailers would 
maintain that access to the iPod is essential for their viability, while 
device manufacturers would insist that access to the iTunes store is 
necessary for any competitive offering.  Access to both of these 
putative essential facilities is controlled, at least in part, by FairPlay.  A 
music retailer who wants maximum iPod interoperability can rely on 
no TPM other than FairPlay.  Similarly, manufacturers who want their 
devices to play the entire iTunes catalog must be able to decrypt 
FairPlay-protected tracks.  Because Apple has refused to license 
FairPlay these facilities have been off limits to its competitors.227 
An “indispensable requirement” of a monopolization claim premised 
on an essential facilities theory is the unavailability of access to that 
facility.228  Here that element appears to be lacking.  Online music 
retailers — including Apple’s chief rivals — have managed to gain 
access to the iPod by selling DRM-free music.  Although major record 
labels refused to distribute their works without TPM restrictions in the 
past, they have relented, perhaps in part in response to studies 
demonstrating that protected content is equally vulnerable to 
widespread infringement.229  Moreover, because Apple itself sells much 
of its catalog in an unrestricted format, devices other than the iPod can 
play iTunes content.  Likewise, to the extent Amazon, Napster, and 
others offer extensive catalogs of DRM-free content at competitive 
 
 224 See Areeda, supra note 195, at 841.  But see Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber 
Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3-5 (2008). 
 225 See Abbot B. Lipsky & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1187, 1218-19 (1999). 
 226 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (holding 87% 
market share was monopoly); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 
(1946) (holding that more than two thirds of market established monopoly). 
 227 Before the introduction of Apple’s iPhone, which combines the feature set of a 
smart phone with an iPod, Apple licensed Motorola’s ROKR, a cellular phone that 
supported playback of FairPlay-protected iTunes tracks.  See Apple.com, Motorola & 
Cingular Launch World’s First Mobile Phone with iTunes (Sept. 7, 2005), 
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/sep/07rokr.html. 
 228 Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“[W]here access exists, the doctrine serves no 
purpose.”). 
 229 See Tim Anderson, How Apple Is Changing DRM, GUARDIAN, May 15, 2008, at 1, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/may/15/drm.apple (reporting 
claim that FairPlay has no effect on infringement). 
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prices, there is little reason to suspect that device manufacturers are 
truly dependent on access to iTunes.  Without evidence that access to 
a distribution platform or device serves as a competitive necessity or 
that access to such a facility is indeed denied, attacks on exclusive 
DRM systems premised on the essential facilities doctrine are unlikely 
to succeed. 
3. Refusal to Deal 
A monopolization claim could also be premised on refusal to deal 
grounds.  Under this theory, Apple’s consistent refusal to license 
Fairplay to competing device manufacturers and download services 
constitutes anticompetitive conduct.230  Courts, however, are generally 
reluctant to interfere with the long-recognized right to refuse 
unilaterally to deal with competitors.231  Forced sharing of 
 
 230 Apple’s refusal to license FairPlay and the resulting tight integration of the iPod 
and iTunes could serve a number of procompetitive purposes.  Apple’s agreements 
with the record labels require it to correct any compromise of the FairPlay system 
within “a small number of weeks . . . or they can withdraw their entire music catalog 
from [the] iTunes store.”  Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music (Feb. 6, 2007), 
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic.  Apple maintains that the 
likelihood of breaches and the difficulty of rectifying them would increase if it 
disclosed its technology to licensees.  As a result, “Apple has concluded that if it 
licenses FairPlay to others, it can no longer guarantee to protect the music it licenses 
from the big four music companies.”  Id. 
Another justification for tight integration is a desire to provide a consistent and 
seamless end-user experience.  Much of the appeal of Apple products stems from their 
ease of use and reliability, features Apple believes are dependent on vertical 
integration.  See LEANDER KAHNEY, INSIDE STEVE’S BRAIN 12 (2008) (“[The] desire to 
craft complete customer experiences ensures Apple controls the hardware, the 
software, online services, and everything else.  But it produces products that work 
seamlessly together and infrequently break down.”).  Apple’s success, while due in 
part to industrial design and marketing, depends on the perception that its products 
“just work.”  See Julio Ojeda-Zapata, Verizon’s Chocolate Phone Isn’t as Sweet as an 
iPod, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 21, 2006, at 1D (“Apple’s hot-selling music players 
are popular because they’re so glitch-free and easy to use.  They just work.”); Jason 
Snell, Inside Apple TV:  What We Know and What’s New Since Last Year’s Announcement, 
MACWORLD, Mar. 1, 2007 (discussing “‘it just works’ simplicity we’ve come to expect 
from Apple”).  The refusal to license its Mac OS to other manufacturers reflects in part 
Apple’s effort to control the user experience by defining hardware configurations.  
Likewise, “had Apple opened its iTunes-iPod juggernaut to outside developers, the 
company would have risked turning its uniquely integrated service into a hodgepodge 
of independent applications.”  Leander Kahney, Evil Genius, WIRED, Apr. 2008, at 138, 
available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/16-04/bz_apple. 
 231 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (explaining that 
Sherman Act “does not restrict the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer 
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
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competitively valuable assets may lessen incentives for investment and 
could lead to collusion among competitors.232  Mandatory licensing of 
IP rights presents additional difficulties.  The power to exclude is the 
core of the IP grant, so antitrust enforcement that denies a rights 
holder the ability to exclude competitors is in tension with the IP 
grant itself.233  As a result, antitrust interferes with enforcement of IP 
rights or unilateral refusals to license only under narrowly defined 
circumstances.234 
Courts have taken two approaches with respect to the refusal to 
license IP rights.  Both approaches endorse the general principle that 
rights holders are free to refuse to license competitors.  Some courts 
have held that such refusals are legal per se.235  Others have imposed a 
rebuttable presumption of legality.236  However, IP rights obtained by 
fraud or that are the subject of sham enforcement efforts are the 
proper focus of antitrust scrutiny.237  Antitrust scrutiny is likewise 
appropriate when rights holders rely on IP grants to “facilitate 
monopolization that extends beyond the scope of the intellectual 
property right itself.”238 
This framework raises two questions when applied to Apple’s 
alleged reliance on the DMCA to monopolize the portable player and 
digital download markets.  First, do the protections the DMCA 
extends to copyright holders, TPM developers, and their licensees 
establish IP rights that fall within this framework?  If so, does Apple’s 
refusal to license FairPlay exceed the scope of its statutory rights?  
 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal”). 
 232 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08 (“Compelling . . . firms to share the source of 
their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law . . . .”). 
 233 See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Unilateral Refusals to License in the U.S., in 
ANTITRUST, PATENTS AND COPYRIGHT:  EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 12, 15-16 (François 
Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
 234 Courts have held that firms that terminate existing profitable courses of dealing 
are subject to antitrust scrutiny.  See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603-05 (1985).  But no court has yet applied that rationale to a 
refusal to license IP rights.  See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 233, at 34. 
 235 See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); see also Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 
2000); Telecomm Tech. Servs. v. Siemens Rolm Commc’ns, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 
1365, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 236 See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 
(9th Cir. 1997); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1186 
(1st Cir. 1994). 
 237 See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965). 
 238 Hovenkamp et al., supra note 233, at 27.  
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The DMCA, which Congress enacted under its commerce authority 
rather than its patent and copyright power, does not confer IP rights 
in the strictest sense of that term.  Nevertheless, it grants powers to 
exclude others from the use of technologies and content sufficiently 
similar to traditional IP rights to suggest that the typical antitrust 
treatment of IP rights should inform analysis of the DMCA.239 
The scope of the rights conferred by the DMCA is ambiguous.  
Chamberlain and Lexmark suggest that the use of TPMs to restrict 
interoperability and reduce competition in ancillary markets may fall 
beyond the legitimate scope of those rights.  But the holdings in those 
cases were not explicitly premised on interference with 
interoperability and hinged, in part, on skepticism regarding the 
underlying copyright interests at stake.240  Few courts would doubt 
that FairPlay protects fully copyrightable expression from a genuine 
threat of unauthorized access.  In addition, the narrow drafting of § 
1201(f) suggests that Congress did not intend to exclude all 
interference with interoperable offerings.  In the end, interference with 
interoperability, standing alone, is unlikely to place DMCA 
enforcement efforts beyond the statute’s legitimate scope.  Ultimately, 
because antitrust is unable to define the legitimate scope of the DMCA 
independently, it must defer to the rights Congress created. 
C. Deferring to the Scope of IP Rights 
Antitrust typically defers to valid exercises of legitimately acquired 
IP rights.  Without this degree of deference, antitrust would risk direct 
conflict with IP doctrine because the rights to exclude that IP provides 
with one hand, antitrust could take away with the other.  This 
deference acknowledges that antitrust law is not well positioned to 
second-guess the scope of IP grants established through the legislative 
process.241  As one commentator explained, “courts cannot and should 
not try to use the antitrust laws to reign [sic] in what may appear to a 
 
 239 But see Chamberlain v. Skylink, 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“Congress chose to create new causes of action for circumvention and for trafficking 
in circumvention devices.  Congress did not choose to create new property rights.”). 
 240 See id. (noting that Chamberlain did not bring a claim for copyright 
infringement); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 
541 & 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing PEP as “purely functional” and rejecting 
district court’s determination that Lexmark’s Toner Loading Program was sufficiently 
original to support preliminary injunction). 
 241 See Hovenkamp, supra note 233, at 23-24 (“[A]ntitrust laws were not designed 
to repair other government regulatory process, but rather to take these processes as 
given and strive to further competition consistent with their mandates.”). 
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judge to be excessive congressional grants of economic power through 
the intellectual property laws.”242 
This deference, however, does not mean that IP rights are altogether 
unchecked.  Patent and copyright have developed internal 
mechanisms for defining the legitimate scope of the rights they confer.  
Aside from generally applicable limitations on the scope and length of 
exclusive rights, patent and copyright law rely on their respective 
misuse doctrines to limit the extent to which rights holders can 
leverage their rights to gain control that exceeds the statutory grant.243  
Although the precise relationship between antitrust and misuse has 
varied over time, the doctrines are closely related and serve a similar 
function — to restrain uses of IP rights that extend beyond the limits 
Congress defined.244 
The extent to which antitrust can target potentially anticompetitive 
exercises of IP rights depends largely on how Congress has crafted, 
and the courts have interpreted, those rights.  When IP rights are over-
broad, the first line of defense should be narrowing the scope of those 
rights, not imposing an additional layer of regulation through antitrust 
enforcement.  Rather than grant an expansive right, await abuse, and 
then rely on antitrust to serve as a corrective, IP policy must recognize 
its obligation to circumscribe carefully the legitimate bounds of the 
rights it confers to avoid harms to competition and innovation.245 
Two cases decided by the European Court of Justice demonstrate 
the importance of both deference to IP rights and the resulting duty of 
IP doctrine to define the limits of its exclusive rights appropriately.  
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission of the European Communities, more 
commonly referred to as the Magill case, arose when three Irish 
television broadcasters obtained an injunction against Magill’s 
publication of a weekly listing of their programming schedules.  Irish 
 
 242 David McGowan, Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729, 780 (2001). 
 243 See Burk, supra note 68, at 571.  In both the patent and copyright contexts, 
misuse is an equitable doctrine that prevents the enforcement of IP rights when a 
rights holder attempts to extend the scope of its statutory grant improperly.  See 
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).  
 244 See Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J. L. & 
TRADE AM. 237, 255 (2007). 
 245 See Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy:  Law Can Prevent the 
Problem That It Can’t Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1999) (arguing with 
respect to potential remedies in Microsoft antitrust litigation that “the key may rest in 
giving [copyright holders] less of a monopoly to begin with, rather than waiting for 
the exploitation of that monopoly to take shape, have effect, and then land a market 
leader in court for antitrust violations”). 
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copyright law provided the broadcasters exclusive rights in their 
program listings, and each published its own weekly programming 
guide.246  Because the injunction prevented Magill from competing 
with these existing weekly listings, it brought a complaint alleging 
violation of European competition law.  Confirming two lower 
decisions, the European Court of Justice was satisfied that the 
broadcasters abused their dominant position in refusing to license 
weekly listings to Magill.247 
Similarly, IMS Health v. NDC Health addressed a refusal by IMS to 
license its “1860 brick structure” — a system for reporting German 
pharmaceutical sales data — to its competitor NDC.248  After years of 
use and promotion by IMS, the 1860 brick emerged as the industry 
standard for packaging data for drug companies, accounting firms, and 
insurance providers.249  When NDC’s predecessor adopted the 1860 
brick to distribute its own independently generated data, IMS sued for 
infringement.  After IMS obtained an injunction barring NDC from 
using the 1860 brick, NDC attempted to obtain a license to use the 
system.  IMS refused, prompting NDC to complain that IMS abused its 
dominant position.  The European Court of Justice, consistent with an 
earlier Commission decision requiring IMS to license the 1860 brick 
structure, ruled that the case, like Magill, presented “exceptional 
circumstances” that justified mandatory licensing of an IP right as a 
matter of competition law.250  
The European approach to the relationship between IP and 
competition law differs in important respects from the deference 
typical in the United States.  Rather than leaving the determination of 
the proper bounds of exclusive rights to the appropriate IP doctrines, 
European competition law scrutinizes IP rights directly.  In large part, 
this approach stems from the fact that competition law is a product of 
the European Economic Community Treaty, while individual member 
states determine the scope of IP rights.251  Reconciliation of national IP 
regimes with the broader goals of “the free movement of goods” 
requires occasional subservience of IP rights to competition 
principles.252 
 
 246 See BBC v. Magill, [1990] I.L.R.M. 534, 541-42 (Ir.). 
 247 Case 241/91P, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n of the European Cmty., 1995 
E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 1. 
 248 IMS Health v. NDC Health, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28, at 1549-50. 
 249 Id. at 1550. 
 250 Id. at 1578-79, 1582. 
 251 See Radio Telefis Eireann, E.C.R. 337 at ¶¶ 2-4. 
 252 See id. 
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Putting aside the differences between the U.S. and E.U. treatment of 
IP and competition law, IMS and Magill teach two lessons.  First, 
antitrust enforcement can create uncertainty and inefficiency if courts 
are free to reconsider existing IP rules.  If IP doctrine alone does not 
settle the question of the proper scope of IP rights, the threat of 
antitrust challenges could result in a lack of clarity that lessens 
incentives for innovation and creativity.  As these cases demonstrate, 
the acquisition and litigation of IP rights are insufficient to adjudicate 
an infringement claim when antitrust enforcement enjoys the latitude 
to enforce standards inconsistent with IP doctrine. 
Perhaps more importantly, Magill and IMS illustrate what happens 
when IP grants fail to account adequately for their potential 
competitive impact.  Although deference ensures greater clarity and 
more efficient adjudication, IP doctrine must keep up its end of the 
bargain by carefully crafting grants of exclusive rights.  There are good 
reasons to doubt the wisdom of the copyright claims endorsed in the 
disputes that underlie Magill and IMS.  Certainly both would be 
suspect under U.S. law.  The Irish decision permitting exclusive rights 
in programming schedules provided exclusive rights in facts, a grant 
fundamentally inconsistent with U.S. law.253  Likewise, U.S. law would 
protect the 1860 brick structure, if at all, by patent.254  Had the 
relevant IP rights not afforded such sweeping protections, neither 
Magill nor NDC would have found themselves in the unenviable 
position of seeking licenses, let alone pursuing competition claims for 
the right to obtain them.  Ultimately, Magill and IMS reflect the impact 
of a failure to tailor IP rights appropriately.255 
Limits on IP rights, however, do more than avoid conflicts with 
antitrust law.  The primary function of IP protection is to create 
incentives for the creation and dissemination of new works.  Even in 
fully competitive markets, the scope of IP rights can be adjusted to 
better serve the instrumental goal of incentivizing new works and the 
ultimate end of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.  
If responsibility for determining the outer limits of IP enforcement is 
left to antitrust, only behavior that threatens competition will be 
prohibited, blunting the ability to fine tune IP policy. 
 
 253 See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
 254 Even if the brick were considered copyrightable subject matter, the external 
constraints facing developers of alternate systems would likely limit the scope of any 
potential copyright protection. 
 255 See Kenneth Glazer, The IMS Health Case:  A U.S. Perspective, 13. GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2006) (“If the [IMS] copyright was questionable, that could (and 
should) have been handled by the copyright system directly.”). 
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Imagine ten competitors that each offer integrated, noninteroperable 
systems for the purchase and playback of TPM-restricted digital music 
downloads.  Rather than a market dominated by the iPod and iTunes, 
assume these ten firms controlled roughly equal-sized shares of the 
device and download markets.  In the absence of some concerted 
action, no threat to competition would exist.  Nonetheless, the power 
to prevent interoperable services still raises important questions for IP 
policy.  From the patent perspective, would more innovation occur 
under a system that offers stronger incentives by limiting 
interoperability?  Or would greater room for new entrants ultimately 
lead to more valuable incremental innovation?  From the copyright 
and DMCA perspective, would noninteroperability encourage greater 
participation by copyright holders in digital marketplaces?  Or would 
interoperability yield broader dissemination of copyrighted works?  
Regardless of the answer to these questions, they should be analyzed 
as matters of IP policy, rather than through the narrower lens of 
antitrust.  As the next Part discusses, legislative change to the DMCA 
offers a preferable means of addressing its impact on interoperability. 
IV. RECONCILING ANTICIRCUMVENTION & INTEROPERABILITY 
The DMCA’s restriction of otherwise permissible uses of 
copyrighted works, including efforts to achieve interoperability, has 
prompted a variety of proposals.  Dan Burk has argued that 
anticircumvention law requires its own doctrine of misuse, drawing on 
analogous patent and copyright doctrines, to address efforts to 
leverage the rights provided by the DMCA.256  Timothy Armstrong has 
suggested that courts should more readily draw on fair use principles 
to create a body of judge-made fair circumvention law.257  Jerome 
Reichman, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Pamela Samuelson have proposed 
a reverse notice and takedown regime under which rights holders 
would be obligated to remove TPM restrictions after user notification 
of a desire to make lawful uses of TPM-protected works.258  Each of 
these proposals has substantial merit and would help address the 
many unintended consequences of the DMCA.  However, none of 
 
 256 Burk, supra note 68, at 571-72. 
 257 Timothy K. Armstrong, Fair Circumvention, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 43-48 (2008). 
 258 Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and Takedown Regime to Enable 
Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
981, 985 (2007); see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle:  
Disaggregating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
111, 116 (2005) (proposing administrative mechanism to enable particular fair uses of 
works protected by DRM). 
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these proposals specifically targets the DMCA’s interference with 
efforts to create unauthorized interoperable technologies.  This Part 
offers a proposal that addresses that narrower concern.259 
Section 1201(f) reflects Congress’s understanding that 
interoperability has value worth preserving.  But the narrow text and 
consistent misinterpretation of § 1201(f) have greatly diminished its 
capacity to safeguard interoperability.  Although more reasonable 
judicial application of § 1201(f) would increase protections for 
interoperability with respect to TPM-restricted computer programs, a 
legislative solution is necessary to enable interoperable use of digitally 
encoded content. 
In addition to the unwarranted distinction between program and 
data at the heart of § 1201(f), the DMCA’s impact on interoperability 
stems from its protection of noncopyright interests.  In its effort to 
facilitate greater control over accessing and copying works, the DMCA 
reinforces both legitimate copyright holder interests and concerns 
entirely divorced from the statutory grant of copyright.  To guard 
against unauthorized copying, for example, content owners can tie 
their works to selected secure platforms.  But this same tethering, and 
its legal enforcement under the DMCA, can be used to prevent 
interoperability for reasons unrelated to concerns over infringement. 
Two changes are necessary to preserve the value Congress intended 
the DMCA to offer copyright holders while making room for 
interoperability.  First, the exclusive focus of § 1201(f) on computer 
programs must be abandoned in favor of an exemption that applies to 
all classes of copyrighted works.  Such a change would recognize the 
role data plays in enabling system-level interoperability.  Second, 
legitimate copyright interests must be disaggregated from the control 
over distribution and playback technologies that impedes 
interoperability.260  The nexus requirement articulated by the Federal 
 
 259 Others have offered limited proposals that address the DMCA’s restriction of 
interoperability in the durable goods context.  See Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of 
Unintended Consequences:  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Interoperability, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 490 (2005) (proposing legislative limitation on application 
of DMCA in cases involving replacement parts for durable goods that incorporate 
software code).  The proposal outlined here, because it addresses the role of data 
interoperability, envisions a more comprehensive response. 
 260 Limiting the ability of TPM providers to sue under the DMCA offers one rough 
means of separating legitimate copyright interests from efforts to restrict 
interoperability.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (2006) (providing remedy to “[a]ny person 
injured by a violation of section 1201”).  As the debate over Real’s Harmony 
demonstrated, copyright holders may not object to all alleged circumvention.  See 
Borland, supra note 182. 
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Circuit in Chamberlain reflects this need to separate copyright and 
noncopyright interests in applying the anticircumvention provisions.  
But there is a risk that future courts will feel more constrained by the 
exceedingly detailed statutory framework of the DMCA and thus less 
inclined to engage in the common law reasoning that gave rise to the 
Chamberlain decision.  The solution offered here provides an 
unambiguous statutory basis for drawing such distinctions. 
The disaggregation of control over copyrighted works from control 
over interoperable technologies addresses the chief difficulty in 
expanding § 1201(f).  Because the anticircumvention provisions 
restrict technologies that interact with TPM-restricted works, a broad 
§ 1201(f) could prove the exception that swallows the rule.  The 
liability provisions of § 1201 could be stripped of practical effect if 
measures protecting copyrighted works could be circumvented to 
achieve interoperability with any device or program without further 
constraints.  Suppose a user wants to render a FairPlay-protected 
iTunes track interoperable with a program capable of playing only 
DRM-free mp3 files.  An unqualified right to achieve interoperability 
would entitle the user to avoid not only those restrictions that tie the 
track to the iPod, but also other substantive limitations on the rights 
acquired by the user.261  Such limitations are not necessarily 
inconsistent with meaningful interoperability.  To the extent 
restrictions intended to effectuate legitimate copyright interests can be 
untangled from those meant to enable control over playback and 
distribution technologies, interoperability can be reconciled with the 
increased control over the copyrighted material that Congress 
intended to bolster. 
The current § 1201(f) contains some limited assurances against 
legitimate copyright holder interests being sacrificed in the name of 
interoperability.  The statute, for example, requires potential 
 
But this approach is both over- and under-inclusive.  The class of copyright holders 
includes device manufacturers, like Lexmark and Chamberlain, keen on limiting 
interoperability.  And financial ties between copyright holders, device manufacturers, 
and TPM providers contribute to a potential overlap of interests.  See Jeff Leeds, 
Microsoft Strikes Deal for Music, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at C1 (describing 
Microsoft’s agreement to pay Universal royalty for each Zune sold).  Equally 
importantly, there may be good reasons to allow TPM providers redress under the 
DMCA.  In trafficking cases, evidence of specific acts of circumvention may be 
lacking, leaving TPM providers better positioned and more motivated to pursue 
§ 1201 claims. 
 261 Such limitations could include caps on the number of computers authorized to 
play a track or the number of times a playlist can be burned to a CD.  They could also 
extend to restrictions on the period of time during which access is authorized in the 
case of subscription or rental services. 
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circumventors to obtain a copy of a work lawfully, guaranteeing that 
only those who purchase, rent, or otherwise furnish some 
consideration in exchange for access are entitled to engage in 
circumvention.262  However, that requirement alone is insufficient 
because it does not secure against unauthorized postsale copying, 
distribution, and access enabled in the name of interoperability. 
Persistent access controls — TPMs that continue to restrict access 
after a user gains initial authorized access — are a controversial 
component of the DMCA landscape.  The statute’s legislative history 
explains that Congress did not intend § 1201 to enable copyright 
holders to limit postsale access to lawfully acquired copies of works.263  
Scholars have also criticized the role that persistent access controls 
play in restricting circumvention that may serve the public interest.264  
Nonetheless, copyright holders and TPM providers rely on such 
controls to restrict postsale access, and courts have expressed little 
hesitation about their enforcement.  
Persistent access controls play a crucial role in rental-based models 
that rely on the ability to terminate access after a customer has 
acquired a fully functional copy of a work.  Because users who 
download films from online rental services, for example, may be 
unwilling simply to delete those files once the rental period has 
expired, TPM-based mechanisms for enforcing the terms of such 
transactions may be desirable.  Persistent access controls are also 
useful in fine-tuning access rights.  Apple’s FairPlay, for example, 
permits users to access protected files on up to five computers, but no 
more.265  By helping copyright holders and TPM providers define the 
bundle of rights consumers acquire, persistent access controls may 
ultimately lead to competition based on the comparative value of 
greater or fewer restrictions.  Absent judicial or congressional 
rejection of persistent access controls, a broadened interoperability 
exemption must account for the restrictions they impose.  
To disaggregate the legitimate copyright interests reflected in TPMs 
from their potential to restrict interoperability for purposes unrelated 
to infringement, a revised § 1201(f) should be conditioned on 
 
 262 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f)(1) (2006). 
 263 H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 17-18 (1998) (“Paragraph (a)(1) does not apply 
to the subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to 
a copy of a work . . . even if such actions involve circumvention . . . .”). 
 264 See Reichman et al., supra note 258, at 1008-09; see also JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT 83, 167, 170, 176 (2001) (noting extent to which persistent access controls 
restrict access to unprotected facts and ideas). 
 265 Jobs, supra note 230. 
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compliance with those restrictions that do not directly implicate 
interoperability.  Such restrictions include limits on the duration of 
access, instances of access, and number of copies a user is entitled to 
make.  If interoperable developers respect such restrictions, copyright 
holders and TPM providers should have no power to tether works to 
approved software or hardware.266 
Imagine a TPM applied to digital video rentals, which imposes two 
distinct restraints.  First, it prevents access after the expiration of a 
thirty-day rental period.  Second, it limits access to approved portable 
devices.  Suppose an unapproved device manufacturer wants to 
interoperate with rentals protected by this TPM.  To qualify for 
exemption under the revised § 1201(f), the manufacturer must 
 
 266 A revised § 1201(f) that implements this approach is included below: 
(f) Interoperability. 
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who 
has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a work may circumvent a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to that work for the 
sole purpose of identifying and analyzing information necessary to achieve 
interoperability with a computer program, if such information has not 
previously been readily available to the person engaging in the 
circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do 
not constitute infringement under this title, and to the extent the 
interoperable computer program enforces any restrictions on the duration of 
access and the number of instances of access defined by the technological 
measure. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(1)(A), (a)(2), and (b), 
a person may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a 
technological measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by a 
technological measure, in order to enable the identification and analysis 
under paragraph (1), or for the purpose of enabling interoperability of a 
work with a computer program, if such means are necessary to achieve such 
interoperability, to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement 
under this title, and to the extent the interoperable program enforces any 
restrictions on the duration of access, number of permitted instances of 
access, or number of permitted copies defined by the technological measure. 
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph 
(1), and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available to 
others solely for the purpose of enabling interoperability of a work with a 
computer program, and to the extent that doing so does not constitute 
infringement under this title or violate applicable law other than this section.  
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “interoperability” means the 
ability of a computer program and another work, including another 
computer program, to exchange information and use the information that 
has been exchanged. 
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enforce the thirty-day expiration date.  Copyright holders would retain 
their power to define the scope of access, but could not dictate the 
playback platforms available to end users. 
This proposal faces a number of potential objections from both sides 
of the interoperability debate.  Proponents of increased freedom to 
interoperate will likely note that this approach does not maximize 
interoperability.  As the major record labels have learned, 
interoperability is most prevalent in an environment in which TPMs 
are altogether absent.  But while the music download market appears 
to be converging around a DRM-free standard, other markets are likely 
to retain DRM, at least in the short term.  Licensed television and 
motion picture content, whether purchased or rented, remains subject 
to DRM, as does music obtained from most subscription services.267  
Where TPMs would continue to restrict access, the revised § 1201(f) 
would not give users the freedom to render content interoperable with 
any device or software they choose because such freedom would 
eliminate the DMCA’s liability provisions altogether.  Instead, the 
revised interoperability exemption outlined here gives developers the 
freedom to design products that interoperate with TPM-restricted 
content so long as they respect the material restrictions on access 
those TPMs were designed to enforce. 
Even if developers have the freedom to interoperate unilaterally 
with TPM-protected systems, the possibility of technological 
interference by TPM providers could dissuade developers from 
investing in interoperable products.  As Apple’s reaction to Harmony 
demonstrates, TPM providers are well positioned to disrupt unwanted 
interoperability.  A revised § 1201(f) could respond to this problem in 
at least two ways.  First, it could do nothing.  Allowing rights holders 
to interfere technologically with attempts to interoperate would bring 
anticircumvention’s interoperability policy back in line with the 
treatment of interoperability in IP generally.  Although trade secrecy, 
copyright, and patent all permit unilateral efforts to interoperate under 
appropriate circumstances, none impose obligations on rights holders 
to refrain from interfering with competitors’ ability to interoperate. 
To the extent that Congress was inclined to promote, rather than 
simply tolerate, unilateral interoperability, it could take a second, 
 
 267 See Jacqui Cheng, If Music DRM Is Dead, the RIAA Expects its Resurrection, ARS 
TECHNICA, May 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/05/if-music-
drm-is-dead-the-riaa-expects-its-resurrection.ars; DefectiveByDesign.org, Apple 
Announces All Music on iTunes to go DRM-Free — No Word on Movies, TV Shows, 
Games, Audiobooks and Applications, http://www.defectivebydesign.org/itunes-drm-
free (Jan. 8, 2009, 15:11 EST).  
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more active approach that provides disincentives against disruptive 
strategies.  Congress could withhold the ability to bring a 
circumvention or trafficking claim, for example, from copyright 
holders or TPM providers that alter the operation of a technological 
measure for the primary purpose of interfering with interoperability.  
Such a rule might draw on the patent and copyright misuse doctrines, 
withholding protection until rights holders take steps to restore 
interoperability.268 
Any legislative proposal addressing the adverse effects of the DMCA 
must also confront the low likelihood of Congress revisiting the 
anticircumvention provisions.  Several legislative efforts, led by 
Representatives Boucher and Lofgren, attempted to lessen the DMCA’s 
impact on noninfringing uses of copyrighted works, but failed to 
overcome the lobbying efforts of the entertainment industry.269  
Although the legislative outlook remains less than promising, there are 
reasons to suspect that the proposal offered here could overcome some 
of the difficulties facing broader reform efforts.  Copyright holders feel 
increasingly threatened by the control TPM providers and device 
manufacturers like Apple wield over the pricing, distribution, and 
playback of digital content.270  Increased interoperability offers one 
way to lessen that control without abandoning DRM altogether.  
Because the revised § 1201(f) separates the interests of copyright 
holders from those of TPM providers, it may increase competition 
among download services and playback devices without sacrificing the 
benefits of TPMs that copyright holders enjoy. 
Nonetheless, copyright holders and TPM providers may object to 
expanding § 1201(f) for other reasons.  First, they could maintain that 
interoperable playback devices and software, even those that faithfully 
adhere to limits on access and copying, could harm the long-term 
robustness of TPM systems, rendering them more susceptible to 
 
 268 Proponents of interoperability would also be justified in noting that loosening 
the control the DMCA enables over interoperable technologies does not address all 
legal impediments to interoperability.  End user license agreements and terms of 
service could continue to restrict reverse engineering and the creation of interoperable 
products.  Likewise, patents will continue to play a role in restricting interoperability. 
 269 See H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1201, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 107, 
108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002); 
see also Calandrillo & Davison, supra note 19, at 383-89 (discussing unsuccessful 
legislative efforts to reform DMCA). 
 270 See Jeff Leeds, Free Song Promotion Is Expected from Amazon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 
2008, at C1 (describing favorable treatment of Amazon’s download service by record 
labels hoping to reduce Apple’s market dominance). 
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circumvention.  Unlicensed players may prove easier to hack, or may 
unintentionally expose decryption keys or other sensitive information. 
The loss of control over playback technology could give rise to some 
potential threat to TPM robustness.  If this risk were sufficient to 
undermine the value of TPMs generally, it could be addressed by an 
additional restriction on the availability of § 1201(f), one conditioned 
on a circumventor’s reasonable steps to ensure the security of the 
original TPM or requiring that the resulting interoperable technology 
not substantially reduce the security of that TPM.  But such conditions 
would greatly undermine the value of an expanded § 1201(f).  The 
potential security risk posed by interoperable technology would prove 
a fact-intensive inquiry that would consistently extend potential 
litigation beyond summary judgment, imposing substantial costs on 
developers of interoperable technologies.  
Any comparative analysis of TPM robustness would, of course, 
depend on the inherent security of a TPM on sanctioned playback 
platforms.  As history demonstrates, every widely deployed DRM 
system has proven susceptible to circumvention, even when copyright 
holders and TPM providers exercised substantial control over 
playback technology.271  Indeed, because all DRM systems must 
ultimately allow consumers some degree of access to protected 
content, they are inherently susceptible to attack.272  Sometimes this 
susceptibility is exploited by sophisticated reverse engineers, other 
times by enterprising teenagers.273  Even the most sophisticated TPMs, 
those termed “unbreakable” by their developers, have fared poorly in 
the wild.274 
 
 271 See generally Fred von Lohmann, Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Against the Darknet:  Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection 
Measures, 24 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L. REV. 635 (2004) (arguing that DMCA fails to reduce 
digital copyright infringement). 
 272 See Bruce Schneier, The Futility of Digital Copy Prevention, CRYPTO-GRAM 
NEWSLETTER, May 15, 2001, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0105.html#3 
(“This is the Achilles’ heel of all content protection schemes based on encryption:  the 
display device must contain the decryption key in order to work . . . .  The end result 
will be failure.  All digital copy protection schemes can be broken, and once they are, 
the breaks will be distributed . . . law or no law.”). 
 273 See Alex Eaton-Salners, DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner:  Freedom of 
Speech and Trade Secrets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 272 (2004) (describing 
involvement of teenager Jon Johansen in creation of DeCSS). 
 274 See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, BluRay’s BD+ DRM Broken, Boing Boing (Mar. 21, 
2008), http://www.boingboing.net/2008/03/21/blurays-bd-drm-broke.html (describing 
cracking of “unbreakable” BD+ protection scheme used on BluRay discs); Ed Felten, 
AACS Plays Whack-a-Mole with Extracted Key (May 1, 2007), http://www.freedom-to-
tinker.com/?p=1152 (describing availability of encryption key used in AACS 
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The very enactment of the DMCA serves as recognition of the 
technological weakness of the measures that restrict access and 
copying of publicly available copyrighted content.  Because code alone 
is incapable of preventing unauthorized use, legal prohibitions 
buttress technological controls.  With or without an expanded § 
1201(f), TPMs will continue to lack the robustness to restrict 
unauthorized use effectively in the absence of legal sanctions.  Because 
the expanded § 1201(f) retains the legal enforcement mechanism 
crucial to the practical value of TPMs, any marginal decrease in their 
already low robustness is unlikely to offset the value of increased 
interoperability. 
But the value of increased interoperability may raise an independent 
objection to an expanded § 1201(f).  In some circumstances, 
interoperability could reduce incentives for certain innovative and 
competitive strategies.275  Allowing interoperability without granular 
consideration of its effect on such incentives threatens to introduce 
uniformity costs.276  An optimal rule, the objection goes, must separate 
beneficial interoperability from its harmful counterpart, otherwise any 
benefits to incremental innovation and static competition come at a 
cost to radical innovation and Schumpeterian competition. 
Interoperability could be socially undesirable in two circumstances:  
first, if it harms copyright interests by enabling unauthorized access 
and copying to a degree that undermines incentives for creation and 
distribution; and second, if it harms incentives for competition and 
innovation.  The first scenario is precisely the concern that motivated 
Congress to enact the DMCA.  If the distribution platforms and 
playback devices used to access digital media cannot make good on 
their promise of technological control over user behavior, copyright 
owners may simply decline to invest in the creation of such content or 
to participate in insecure digital marketplaces.  These concerns, 
putting aside their likelihood, would be addressed by the revised 
§ 1201(f)’s separation of copyright and noncopyright interests.  By 
requiring interoperable technologies to adhere to restrictions on access 
and copying, this statutory change would filter out those interoperable 
technologies most likely to harm copyright interests.  
 
protection system employed on BluRay discs). 
 275 See supra Part I.B. 
 276 See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All:  The Problem of Uniformity Cost in 
IP Law, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 845 (2006) (explaining that uniform IP rights tend to 
provide insufficient protection to those who invest in costly innovations, while 
overprotecting those, who because of low innovation costs, require less incentive to 
innovate). 
  
2009] Rethinking Anticircumvention’s Interoperability Policy 1619 
The second scenario contemplates a very different concern, one 
Congress never intended the DMCA to address.  Without the added 
exclusivity provided by § 1201’s restrictions on interoperable 
technologies, the worry goes, innovators like Apple will be less inclined 
to invest in developing products like the iPod.277  Assuming that 
interoperability decreases incentives to a degree sufficient to reduce 
innovation — at best, an uncertain assumption — such incentives are 
beyond the goals of the DMCA and outside the scope of copyright 
policy generally.  The DMCA’s interoperability policy cannot balance all 
innovative and creative incentives in isolation.  Instead, it should be 
understood as a more modest tool intended to preserve the existing 
incentive structures of copyright law.  Moreover, it should be seen as a 
single component of IP’s broader interoperability policy.  To the extent 
limiting interoperability is necessary to preserve incentives for 
innovation, those restrictions should be, and are, defined within the 
patent system, not the DMCA’s anticircumvention provisions.  Any 
argument that the DMCA is necessary to spur innovation in playback 
technologies only reinforces the threat that § 1201 allows a back door to 
the more robust protections of patent law, evading its longstanding and 
more demanding requirements for exclusivity. 
The DMCA currently affords a degree of control over interoperable 
technologies incongruous with the treatment of interoperability under 
traditional IP regimes.  This control extends to any device or service 
incorporating a TPM that satisfies the trivial effectiveness requirement 
of § 1201.  To limit the DMCA’s broad protections, § 1201(f)’s 
exemption should be expanded to embrace the circumvention of 
TPMs protecting all classes of copyrighted works, not just computer 
programs.  But the availability of this broadened exemption should be 
conditioned on a developer’s adherence to other substantive 
restrictions on accessing and copying the underlying work.  This 
expansion of § 1201(f) would convert the DMCA’s treatment of 
interoperability from an aberration to a cohesive component of IP’s 
interoperability policy.  Developers would regain the freedom to create 
interoperable products unilaterally, but copyright holders would 
retain the ability to restrict access and copying even within this 
interoperable environment. 
 
 277 The iPod, of course, was developed and released to overwhelming commercial 
success years before Apple sold a single DRM-protected song.  So the need for the 
added exclusivity offered by the DMCA proved unnecessary to spur innovation in at 
least one instance. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted the DMCA to enable thriving online markets for 
copyrighted works by providing rights holders with tools to guard 
against unauthorized access and widespread infringement.  Despite 
Congress’s efforts, the DMCA also gave rise to broad powers over 
playback and distribution technologies, which interfere with IP law’s 
longstanding tolerance of unauthorized unilateral interoperability.  
Ironically, this control over interoperability could hamper the further 
development of the very markets Congress intended the DMCA to 
foster.  Likewise, restrictions on interoperability conflict with 
copyright’s ultimate purpose — the dissemination and use of cultural 
works in the progress of science — by preventing authorized 
purchasers of copyrighted material from making use of those works.  
Antitrust offers, at best, an imperfect means of redressing the 
DMCA’s impact on interoperability.  Not all interference with 
interoperability gives rise to cognizable competitive harms.  In 
addition, the deference antitrust shows towards legitimately acquired 
IP rights requires rights holders to exceed the scope of their statutory 
grants before facing antitrust liability. 
As a result, internal clarification and adjustment of the DCMA’s 
scope offer the best hope for reestablishing the legitimacy of 
unauthorized interoperability.  This approach recognizes the need for 
IP doctrine to tailor carefully the protections it offers and to take 
responsibility for their unintended consequences.  The expansion of 
the § 1201(f) interoperability exemption outlined here addresses 
anticircumvention’s impact on interoperability, but does so without 
ignoring the concerns over unauthorized access and copying that 
motivated the DMCA.  
Ultimately, as copyright holders, content distributors, and device 
manufacturers have begun to realize, and as consumers have long 
understood, complete freedom to interoperate depends on the absence 
of technological restrictions on copyrighted works.  The use of TPMs, 
however, will undoubtedly continue in some markets.  Their legal 
reinforcement, however, can and should accommodate the freedom to 
interoperate. 
